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Childish Nonsense?
The Value of Interpretation
in Plato’s Protagoras
F r a nc o V . T r ivi g n o *

in the protagoras, plato presents us with a puzzle regarding the value of interpretation. On the one hand, Socrates claims to find several familiar Socratic
theses about morality and the human condition in his interpretation of a poem
by Simonides (339e−347a). On the other hand, immediately after the interpretation, Socrates castigates the whole task of interpretation as “childish nonsense”
appropriate for second-rate drinking parties (347d5−6).1 The core problem is
this: taking Socrates’s interpretation of Simonides seriously requires undermining the significance of the claims about interpretation, but taking the criticism
of interpretation seriously requires undermining the significance of Socrates’s
interpretation of Simonides.2
Broadly speaking, there have been two approaches to this puzzle in the literature. First (this is the most common approach), commentators have simply
ignored Socrates’s interpretation as philosophically insignificant, since Socrates
is being playful and ironic throughout. For example, A. E. Taylor claims that taking the interpretation seriously “ought to be impossible for [anyone] with a sense
of humor.”3 In partial defense of his position, Taylor claims that the “professed
exegesis . . . is only arrived at by a series of violences done to its language.”4 Such
commentators simply take the actual interpretation to be playful, ironic and
unserious—a parody of sophistic interpretation—and thus to verify Socrates’s
I would like to express my gratitude for the generous feedback I received from Theresa Tobin
and Ingvild Torsen and for the helpful comments of the anonymous referees.
1
All quotations from the Protagoras in translation, with minor alterations, are Lombardo and Bell’s
in Cooper, Plato: Complete Works, 746−90. For a reading of the dialogue that makes this criticism of
interpretation central to its overall purpose, see Griswold “Relying on Your Own Voice.”
2
Scholars who take this puzzle seriously include Frede, “The Impossibility of Perfection”; Pappas,
“Socrates’ Charitable Treatment”; and McCoy, “Socrates on Simonides.”
3
Taylor, Plato, 256.
4
Taylor, Plato, 255.
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later claim about interpretation, that it is a childish endeavor. This view comes
up against two core objections: first, prior to his interpretation, Socrates insists
not only that he knows the poem and has carefully considered it but also that the
poem is “very well done” (339b5−c7); thus, Socrates seems himself to have taken
the poem seriously. Second, Socrates uses the poem to defend philosophical claims
that he advances both in the Protagoras and elsewhere. In other words, the content
of the interpretation squares with Socrates’s general philosophical position.
A second, more recent approach takes the interpretation seriously, even while
acknowledging that it is arrived at via a blatantly self-serving manipulation of Simonides’s poem.5 The passage is said to have philosophical significance insofar as
it elaborates a Socratic picture of the human condition. Frede claims that Socrates
is serious about “the main points of his own interpretation,” but she concedes that
he “repeatedly has to distort the text to serve his own purposes.” 6 McCoy argues
for the serious nature of the interpretation qua picture of the human condition,
but she also concedes that Socrates arrives at it through a series of “deliberate misreadings.”7 Part of their motivation seems to be to justify both the section’s length
and its central position in the dialogue.8 Pappas goes further than both Frede and
McCoy in attributing to Socrates an interpretive methodology, which amounts to
a radical application of the principle of charity, whereby the poet is made to say,
on principled grounds, whatever Socrates thinks is true.9 This second approach
comes up against two objections: First, Socrates is playful and ironic throughout
the section and does not seem to be presenting a serious interpretation, much
less employing a serious interpretive methodology. Second, taking the interpretation seriously even at this level seems to flatly contradict what Socrates says about
the value of interpretation, which he does not say in a playful or ironic manner.
My aim in this paper is to carve out a third alternative. Both positions agree
that a series of violences is being done to Simonides’s text, but they understand
the significance of this in completely different ways. The first approach takes the
manipulations to mean that the interpretation is a parody, whereas the second ap5
Frede, “The Impossibility of Perfection”; McCoy, “Socrates on Simonides.” This approach can
also be found in Demos, Lyric Quotation, ch. 2.
6
Frede, “The Impossibility of Perfection,” 737.
7
McCoy, “Socrates on Simonides,” 358.
8
Their strategies for doing so differ substantially. Frede (“The Impossibility of Perfection,” 747−49)
argues that what she considers the serious part of the interpretation section (343c−347a) was a later
interpolation, written around the time that Plato was composing the Symp. This is meant to explain the
philosophical sentiments of the interpretation, which resonate with those of the Symp. Her view further
explains, or rather explains away, the seeming contrast between the interpretation and the critique of
interpretation. On her view, the latter was originally directed at the comic interpretation (339e−343c),
which directly preceded the critique in the earlier version. McCoy (“Socrates on Simonides,” 349) by
contrast wants to preserve the overall unity of the dialogue with the interpretation section as a crucial
part of Socrates’s larger argument strategy.
9
Pappas, “Socrates’ Charitable Treatment,” 252−59, esp. 256−57. On Donald Davidson’s seminal
account of the principle of charity (see e.g. “Radical Interpretation”), one seeks to maximize the agreement between oneself and the speakers one interprets. Concerning Socrates’s use of this principle,
Pappas (“Socrates’ Charitable Treatment,” 256) claims that “[i]n order to derive true statements from
a poem, Socrates is positively compelled to attribute his beliefs to every author.” See Scodel, “Literary
Interpretation,” who also attributes to Socrates an application of the principle of charity, though she
and Pappas differ significantly concerning the overall upshot of the passage and Socrates’s attitude
toward the principle itself.
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proach takes them to mean that Socrates is elaborating his philosophical position
through the poem. A common assumption of both positions seems to be that if
Socrates’s interpretation is a parody, then it can be safely ignored as philosophically
insignificant; this implies that if it has philosophical significance, then it is not a
parody.10 Advocates of the first approach, satisfied with saying that it is a parody,
thus typically ignore Socrates’s interpretation, while advocates of the second approach pay attention to Socrates’s interpretation but ignore or marginalize the
parodic elements. In my view, the passage has philosophical significance because it
is a parody. As I have argued elsewhere, Plato uses parody as a critical philosophical
tool, which targets certain practices and methodologies, often implicitly relying
on an ideal to which the target fails to live up.11 Thus, the mere fact that Socrates
parodies the interpretation of poetry does not necessarily mean that he thinks
interpretation is a totally useless endeavor. Rather, I argue that Socrates’s interpretive manipulations of Simonides’s poem articulate parodic criticisms of a certain
kind of interpretation, namely, ‘sophistic interpretation,’ and that this critique
implicitly relies on an ideal of interpretation—what I am calling ‘philosophical
interpretation.’ Philosophical interpretation, however, can only partly escape the
explicit criticisms of interpretation that Socrates articulates, and it thus only has
limited value.
In section 1, I provide the methodological context (334c−339a) and articulate
Protagoras’s model of education, in which the interpretation of poetry stands at the
forefront. Then, in section 2, I show how Protagoras’s own sophistic interpretation
of Simonides’s poem (339a−d), what I am calling an ‘eristic interpretation,’ aims
at scoring a victory over both Simonides and Socrates and is supposed to demonstrate Protagoras’s superior skill. In section 3, I examine Socrates’s interpretation
of Simonides’s poem (339e−347a), describe its philosophical content, and analyze
the parody to reveal the parodic criticisms and the underlying ideal. Socrates
parodies both eristic interpretation and a second type of sophistic interpretation,
what I am calling ‘parasitic interpretation,’ which exploits the fame and reputation
of the poet in order to justify one’s contentions to an audience. As I show, both
eristic and parasitic interpretation share an appeal to the authority of the poet, an
exploitative and mercenary attitude to the text of the poem, and an indifference
to the truth of the claims under discussion. I argue that these criticisms rely on an
ideal of interpretation, philosophical interpretation, which remains indifferent
to the authority of the poet, attempts a plausible reconstruction of the poem so
that a philosophical view is being articulated, and critically assesses and tests this
view.12 In section 4, I analyze and lay out Socrates’s explicit critique of interpreta10
See e.g. Pappas, “Socrates’ Charitable Treatment,” 254. Examples of this kind of reasoning are
numerous. Vlastos (Plato’s Protagoras, xxxiv) claims that Socrates becomes a “practical joker, almost
a clown” and does not see any good reason for him to “act out this dubious metaphor in a labored
one-man charade.” Demos (Lyric Quotation, 11) for her part, claims that the relevant “section of the
dialogue, which some consider a comic digression on Plato’s part, has a serious intent.” The underlying assumption seems to be that the comic and the serious are mutually exclusive: for a clear-headed
diagnosis of this mistake, see Silk, Aristophanes and the Definition of Comedy, 310−20.
11
See Trivigno, “The Rhetoric of Parody.”
12
The philosopher, in short, tests the content of the poem to see whether it contains any truth, i.e.
mythos is subjected to logos, to borrow a phrase from Halliwell, “The Subjection of Muthos to Logos.”
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tion (347a−348a), wherein Socrates castigates the interpreter’s failure to use his
own voice, the greatest part of which involves testing himself and aiming at the
truth. Interpretation is, in short, set against the standard of living philosophical
dialectic. In section 5, I come back to the larger question of the value of interpretation of poetry. I claim that the ideal of philosophical interpretation can only
partly escape the explicit criticisms, since it can at best be an imitation of, and
provocation for, living philosophical dialectic. It thus only has limited value, and
it gets such value from a possible, but contingent, relation to truth. In section 6, I
consider an objection to my position, namely, that Plato thinks that paying attention to poetry is, in itself, harmful and thus the idea that interpretation of poetry
has even limited value cannot be plausibly attributed to him.

1. the methodological dispute: the protagorean
model of education (334c−339a)
Socrates’s discussion with Protagoras on the unity of virtue and the nature of goodness grinds to a halt after Socrates successfully shows Protagoras to be committed
to a contradiction (333a−b). Protagoras begins to resist answering Socrates’s questions (333b3−4, d1−3, e2−5) and then launches into a short speech on the relativity of advantage and disadvantage (334a−c). Socrates, claiming to be a “forgetful
person” (334c8−9), objects to the length of the speech, insists that Protagoras
give short answers to his questions, and twice threatens to leave (334c−335e).
After much bickering over how to gauge the appropriate length of an answer
and several attempted interventions by the audience to keep the conversation
going, a compromise is reached whereby Protagoras and Socrates will take turns
questioning each other (338e).
Protagoras begins by articulating his model of education in which interpretation of poetry stands at the forefront. He claims that the “greatest part of a man’s
education is to be clever about poetry [περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν εἶναι]” (338e6−339a1).
This cleverness encompasses four distinct abilities: (1) to understand what the
poet means; (2) to understand what is composed correctly and what is not; (3) to
know how to analyze a poem; (4) to know how to give an account in response to
questions about the poem.13 The interpretation of poetry, on this view, seems to
stand on its own as an important skill for any educated person to have. Protagoras’s
model is not to be lightly dismissed, since assumptions about the wisdom of poets
and the important role of memorizing and reciting poetry in moral education
were widely shared.14 Given the “widespread and persistent nature of the habit”
of “invoking and citing poetic texts to formulate, illustrate, or reinforce a point of
view,”15 what Protagoras offers may be described as advanced lessons in this activ13
Even though neither Protagoras nor Socrates use the Greek term for interpretation, ἑρμενεύω, in
the Prt., I think that I am justified in glossing what Protagoras describes as ‘interpretation’ because of
the close similarities between what Protagoras describes here and what Socrates describes Ion as doing
in the Ion (530b−d). In that dialogue, Socrates does mention ‘interpretation,’ and I see no reason to
think that Plato did not mean to implicate the same kind of activity in the Prt.
14
See Halliwell, “The Subjection of Muthos to Logos,” 94−98, for a compelling account of the
cultural background against which common practice of poetic citation ought to be understood.
15
Halliwell, “The Subjection of Muthos to Logos,” 95.
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ity, which will enable a speaker to succeed in bringing the poet as a witness for his
own view.16 Further, whether or not one agrees with Protagoras about the overall
value of these abilities, they do seem to present a fairly reasonable picture of the
interpretation of poetry. Protagoras’s account encompasses both an interpretive
and a critical dimension, gives consideration to the poet’s intentions, and explicitly
leaves room for rational discussion. Having formulated his methodological position, Protagoras endeavors to question Socrates about the very topic they had been
discussing, virtue, but “transferred to the context of poetry” (339a4−6). It is at this
point that one might be more inclined to object: what does it mean to transfer a
topic like virtue to the context of poetry, and is such a move legitimate? It is in light
of these larger methodological issues that one must understand both Socrates’s
parody and critique of interpretation and his subjection of interpretation to the
standards of his own rival model of philosophical conversation.17

2. eristic interpretation: protagoras against
simonides and socrates (339a−d)
Protagoras attempts to demonstrate his skill at interpreting poetry through his
own interpretation of Simonides’s poem to Scopas. He begins by quoting the first
few lines:
ἄνδρ᾽ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν,
χερσίν τε καὶ ποσὶ καὶ νόῳ τετράγωνον, ἄνευ ψόγου τετυγμένον.18
For a man to become good is truly hard
In hands and feet and mind foursquare
Blamelessly built . . . (339b1−b3)

He then asks if Socrates needs the sophist to recite the rest for him. This
innocent-seeming question can be seen as part of Protagoras’s eristic strategy,
for he is already testing Socrates’s knowledge of the poem and conversely demonstrating his own. Socrates responds that he “knows the poem, and happens to
have given very special attention to it [πάνυ μοι τυγχάνει μεμεληκὸς τοῦ ᾁσματος]”
(339b5−6). As a result of this attention, he claims that the poem “is very well-made
[πάνυ . . . <καλῶς> τε καὶ ὀρθῶς]” (339b8)19 Socrates’s praise of the poem here is
not disingenuous or ironic, nor does his claim to have given special attention to
the poem seem to be false.
Protagoras clearly has a competitive agenda, claiming that a poem cannot be
“well-made [καλῶς πεποιῆσθαι] if the poet contradicts himself” (339b9−10). He
then quotes a line later in the ode:
οὐδέ μοι ἐμμελέως τὸ Πιττάκειον νέμεται,
καίτοι σοφοῦ παρὰ φωτὸς εἰρημένον· χαλεπὸν φάτ᾽ ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι.

On this practice, see also Aristotle, Met. 995a7−8.
See Griswold, “Relying on Your Own Voice,” 286−87, on what he describes as the “rivalry of
moral ideals” underlying the dispute about education.
18
All Greek quotations are from Burnet, Platonis Opera, vol. III.
19
On the ambiguity of καλῶς and ὀρθῶς as adverbial assessments of the quality of poems in the
Ion, see Dorter, “The Ion: Plato’s Characterization of Art”; Trivigno, “Technê, Inspiration and Comedy.”
16
17
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Nor is Pittacus’s proverb in tune,
However, wise a man he was.
Hard it is to be good, he said. (339c3−5)

Socrates does not immediately see the contradiction, and Protagoras’s interpretation culminates in a short speech, in which he accuses Simonides of saying both
that it is, and that it is not, hard to be good (339d−e). In this passage, Protagoras
purports to have demonstrated both that he has the four abilities that constitute
cleverness about poetry and that Socrates does not have them. Protagoras seems
to understand the poet’s words, to analyze the poem, to show that it is not wellmade, and to successfully answer Socrates’s question about it, whereas Socrates,
by contrast, seems naive about the poem and not to have noticed an obvious
contradiction.
I label this kind of interpretation ‘eristic interpretation’ because it aims at bolstering one’s own reputation by showing oneself superior to a figure of reputed
wisdom—either the poet under discussion, the person to whom one is speaking,
or both.20 By showing a poet like Simonides to be inferior to himself, Protagoras
thereby elevates his own public stature. Indeed, Protagoras’s interpretation is
eristic in both senses, since it is clearly his intention to win fame at the expense of
both Simonides and Socrates. At this task, the sophist is quite successful: he gets
a round of applause from the audience, and Socrates compares the final move
in Protagoras’s interpretation—his short speech—to being “hit by a good boxer”
(339e1−2).21
Even in this short Platonic depiction of sophistic interpretation, we can see
some grounds for dissatisfaction. First, there is a clear sense in which Protagoras’s
interpretation is epideictic—that he is just showing off for the crowd that he is
superior to a reputedly wise man. His interest in the poet masks a deeper interest
in self-promotion. Second, his attitude toward the text seems mercenary at best.
He plucks two passages out of context and shows that they contradict one another.
Indeed, as Socrates will show, not only is Protagoras’s reading not careful, since the
passages do not actually contradict one another, but the larger context also gives
information that helps us to see more clearly that there is no contradiction.22 Third,
Protagoras does not say anything at all about the content of the lines he quotes
concerning what it is, or means, to be good. His display is completely indifferent
to the robust content of the poem or the truth of the claims about goodness. In
transferring the discussion about virtue to the context of poetry, Protagoras has
left the content entirely behind.

20
For the analogy between eristic and wrestling, see Euthd. 277d. See Aristotle, Poet. 1456b15, in
which the first lines of the Iliad are said to have been criticized by Protagoras. This at least suggests
that latter engaged in eristic interpretation of poetry fairly frequently.
21
Woodbury (“Simonides on ’Αρετή,” 140−41) calls Protagoras’s performance a “tour de force”
and rightly points out the contradiction the sophist finds cannot have been obvious to those familiar
with the poem.
22
See Aristotle, Poet. 1461a31–5; b15–18 . He formulates an interpretive principle that one should
both consider alternative meanings and make every effort to resolve an apparent contradiction in a text.
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3. the socratic parody (339e−347a)
In this section, I argue that Socrates’s interpretation of Simonides parodies two
types of sophistic interpretation: eristic and what I am calling ‘parasitic interpretation.’ A parody is “an imitation which distorts its target, often revealing certain
criticisms”; in an earlier article, I argued that the rhetoric of Platonic parody can
be seen as complex, in the sense that a parody expresses a criticism while at the
same time pointing beyond the criticisms to an implied ideal, which the parodied
text fails to live up to.23 Thus, the fact that the passage contains a parody does not
imply that it should be ignored or passed over as merely comedic. The comedy
makes a serious philosophical point.
Frede and McCoy, who want to shine interpretive light on Socrates’s interpretation, do so by splitting it up into serious and comic parts, so that the serious
content can be gleaned and the comedic parts ignored. Frede, for example, splits
up Socrates’s interpretation into three sections. The first two sections are, on her
view, a “mock display of the sophistic art” (339e−342a) and a “funny . . . and fanciful description of the alleged secret conventions of the Spartans” (342a−343c); in
her view, the third section (343c−347a) is “different in character and language”
than the first two. She essentially ignores the first two parts and concentrates on
the “serious” part.24 I think such a division runs roughshod over the text, ignoring both the consistently comic tone and the division breaks that Socrates himself
signals.25 In my view, the passage naturally breaks up into two equally comedic
sections: in the first section (339e−342a), Socrates refutes Protagoras’s interpretation by engaging in a parody of eristic interpretation using short question and
answer. In the second (342a−347a), Socrates parodies what I am calling parasitic
interpretation by giving a long speech in which Simonides’s poem is made to be
about philosophy and to articulate a Socratic picture of the human condition.
What Socrates emphatically does not do, in my view, is all of a sudden abandon
his comedic performance and begin to interpret the poem in earnest. Indeed,

Trivigno, “The Rhetoric of Parody,” 30−32.
Frede, “The Impossibility of Perfection,” 739.
25
Frede’s division has three further problems: first, it places a key component of Socrates’s
supposedly serious interpretation—the difference between being and becoming—in a comedic section (339e−342a), what she calls “a mock display of the sophist’s art.” Second, her second section
(342a−343c) is in a kind of no-man’s land and artificially divorced from what she calls the third
(343c−347a). These two are clearly bound together by the fact that, in 342a−343c, Socrates formulates a thesis about the content and intention of Simonides’s poem and, in 343c−347a, he defends it.
Third, as Frede herself admits (“The Impossibility of Perfection,” 745−46), the last part of Socrates’s
supposedly serious interpretation (343c−347a), the one affirming the impossibility of voluntarily doing evil (345c−346c), is not serious. McCoy (“Socrates on Simonides,” 352−54), perhaps noticing the
flaws in Frede’s divisions, breaks up the passage into three distinct attempts: the first establishes the
being and becoming distinction (339e−340d), the second is “a humorous application of Prodicus’
fine distinctions” (340d−341e), and the last contains the core philosophical content (and the passage about the Spartans) (341e−347a). On her view, the first and the third attempts elaborate the
serious philosophical view, while the second consists mainly in teasing Protagoras and Prodicus and
distancing Socrates from the latter’s methods (353−54). McCoy’s divisions are more sensitive to the
text than Frede’s, but it seems artificial to break up Socrates’s use of Prodicus-inspired distinctions
into two attempts, despite Protagoras’s forceful objection between them. Thus, I agree with Frede that
339e−342a forms a unit and with McCoy that 342a−347a forms a unit.
23
24
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since everyone seems to agree that Socrates distorts the text, it is not clear which
aspect of the interpretation is supposed to be serious.26

3.1 Socrates’s Parody of Eristic Interpretation (339e−342a)
In the first part of the parody, Socrates beats Protagoras at his own eristic game,
while at the same time exposing eristic interpretation as a kind of empty argumentative gymnastics.27 Indeed, whereas Protagoras manages to aggrandize himself
at the expense of both Socrates and Simonides, Socrates, by allying himself with
Simonides, manages to do the same at the expense of Protagoras and Prodicus.
Socrates, allegedly dazed by the expert eristic boxing of Protagoras, begins his
“rehabilitation” of Simonides by calling on Prodicus and his famous distinctionmaking (339e−340b). He asks, “[a]re becoming [τὸ γενέσθαι] and being [τὸ εἶναι]
the same or different?” (340b4−5). Prodicus’s emphatic affirmative indicates that
the question is embarrassingly easy, and Socrates proceeds rightly to point out that
while Simonides says it is hard to become good (ἀγαθὸν . . . γενέσθαι), he quotes
Pittacus as saying that it is hard to be good (ἐσθλὸν ἔμμεναι).28 This is a striking
blow against Protagoras, who would have clearly been expected to know and to
recognize the distinction. However, as several scholars have noticed, Simonides’s
own usage of these terms in the rest of the poem belies the idea that the poet has a
strict distinction in mind between being and becoming.29 When Socrates suggests
that Simonides agrees with Hesiod’s claim that goodness is difficult (χαλεπήν) to
acquire but easy (ῥηϊδίην) once one has attained it (340c8−d5), Prodicus applauds,

26
At minimum, the interpretation is serious in the sense of pertaining to and expressing important
moral claims. Most agree that Socrates’s interpretation is not serious in the sense of being an honest
interpretation of Simonides, but there has been wide and longstanding disagreement over the original
meaning of the poem, including whether it has any ethical implications whatsoever; see Parry, “An
Interpretation of Simonides 4 (Diehl),” 298−304, for various possibilities. A subset of scholars, including
Frede (“The Impossibility of Perfection,” 737) and Demos (Lyric Quotation, 11), thinks that Socrates’s
interpretation is broadly correct as well: see also e.g. Donlan, “Simonides Fr. 4d and P. Oxy. 2432”;
Babut, “Simonide Moraliste.” But even if this is true, surely it matters a great deal how one comes to the
right interpretation, just as it matters to Socrates a great deal how one comes to the truth. The latter
methodological point about inquiry is surely relevant and becomes explicitly so in Socrates’s critique
of interpretation. Given the manner in which Socrates arrives at his interpretation, it does not matter
that much whether or not Socrates’s interpretation is correct in some sense.
27
Demos (Lyric Quotation, 14) refers to this exchange as “an agōn in which Socrates is intent
upon demonstrating that Protagoras is not as keen a literary critic (or one who ranks himself as sophos
as the poets) as he himself thinks.” Demos is surely right to see this passage as an agōn, but that it is
no way incompatible with it also being a parody. Indeed, the parodic aspect provides the agōn with
the necessary critical perspective by which the task of interpretation is exposed as useless. Further, if
Socrates’s purpose were merely to show that he can beat Protagoras at his own game, it is hard to see
why he continues with his interpretation even after he has defeated the latter in the eristic section.
For a similar criticism of the idea, espoused in Barney, “Socrates Agonistes: The Case of the Cratylus
Etymologies,” 85−88, that being an agōn is incompatible with being a parody, see Trivigno, “Etymology
and the Power of Names.”
28
ἔμμεναι is an Epic form: see LSJ, s.v. εἰμί. It is worth noting that Socrates might have called upon
Prodicus to differentiate between ἀγαθός and ἐσθλός. Bowra (Greek Lyric Poetry, 340−51) for example,
makes his own interpretation of the poem turn on a difference between these terms, as does Woodbury,
“Simonides on ’Αρετή,” 56−57.
29
See e.g. Woodbury, “Simonides on ’Αρετή,” 150−51, 150 n29.
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but Protagoras goes on the attack. It is worth noting that, as we will see, Socrates
does not really think that Simonides agrees with Hesiod at all.30
Protagoras continues his eristic assault on both Simonides and Socrates by
claiming that Socrates’s rehabilitation “has a crippling error greater than the one
[he] is correcting” and that Simonides’s ignorance “would be monumental if he
says the possession of virtue is so trivial [φαῦλόν τί] when everyone agrees that it
is the hardest thing [χαλεπώτατον] in the world” (340d7−8, e5−7). Protagoras
here commits a fallacy of equivocation, taking the opposite of ‘hard’ to be ‘trivial’
(φαῦλόν) as opposed to ‘easy’ (ῥηϊδίην), as Hesiod had it. In doing so, Protagoras
attempts to reclaim his victory over Socrates and Simonides by appealing to common opinion,31 while at the same time defeating an arguably greater foe, Hesiod.
Again, we see Protagoras using an implausible and self-serving interpretation of
the text, this time of Hesiod, to make himself seem grander. And again, we see
Protagoras failing to reflect in any way on the content of his claims, making it
seems like virtue is valuable because it is difficult to acquire.
In response, Socrates shifts allegiances in the eristic game, by calling on Prodicus again, but this time inducing him to say something ridiculous, to which
Protagoras rightly objects. At the same time, Socrates manages both openly and
subtly to insult Protagoras and indirectly to suggest that the interpretation of
poetry, as Protagoras conceives of it, is worth nothing. Socrates, claiming that
Prodicus’s wisdom is beyond Protagoras, suggests that Simonides meant something
different by ‘hard’ (χαλεπὸν) than what Protagoras understands. In explaining
what he means, Socrates adduces the example of ‘δεινός’, which means “fearful
and terrible,” “strong and powerful” and “skillful and clever.”32 He claims that
Prodicus has chided him for using ‘δεινός’ to praise another, as in “Protagoras is a
wise and δεινός man,” on the grounds that δεινός is bad (κακόν, 341a7−b2). This
example cuts in multiple directions. First, the value of arbitrarily restricting the
semantic scope of ‘δεινός’ is called into question, and with it, the usefulness of
Prodicus’s art.33 Second, Socrates subtly suggests that Protagoras is in fact δεινός
30
Socrates paraphrases Hesiod, Works and Days, 289, 291−92. Another poem of Simonides, PMG
579, in Page, Poetae Melici Graeci, contains the very similar image of virtue on the top of a steep cliff,
which may very well refer directly to Hesiod. It is not clear from the fragment whether Simonides is
endorsing the claim or not: he begins with “there is a story,” but we do not have Simonides’s judgment on the story.
31
In the Great Speech (320c−328d), we see Protagoras employing the strategy of appealing to
common opinion throughout: see e.g. 323d5−8; a5−7. This appeal to common opinion is legitimate,
in part because, on his view, everyone possesses political virtue (see esp. 322d−323a). The connection between Protagoras’s own strategy and Socrates’s later attribution of the views leading up to the
formulation of the hedonic calculus to “the many” may lend indirect support to those who consider
Socrates to be there elaborating a Protagorean as opposed to a Socratic view.
32
See LSJ, s.v.
33
McCoy (“Socrates on Simonides,” 353) suggests that one problem with Prodicus’s method is
that it “affixes fixed, precise meanings to words without attention to their context” (my emphasis). This
is right on target, in my view, for it is not at all clear what is achieved by such distinctions from a
philosophical perspective. Indeed, the Cratylus, in which Prodicus is referenced as an expert on the
correctness of names (384b), can be seen as making precisely this point against etymology: on this
possibility, see Trivigno, “Etymology and the Power of Names.” Through the exercise of his art in the
Protagoras, Prodicus is made to look foolish and utterly incapable of distinguishing meanings. That
Prodicus is obsessed with distinction making as a methodology is presumably part of the intention
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in the bad sense, that he is a dangerous opponent to philosophy and to the life of
genuine virtue. Third, recall that Protagoras made being ‘δεινός’ (translated above
as “clever”) about poetry a core component of education. The suggestion is that
this skill is also bad. Indeed, ‘δεινός,’ like ‘clever’ in English usage, contains an
ambiguous estimation of an alleged skill.34 More broadly, one also should recall
that Hippocrates, when pressed, pinned down Protagoras’s alleged expertise as
the ability to “make others clever speakers [δεινὸν λέγειν]” (312d6−7). The subtle
implication here is, thus, that not only are Protagoras and his skills bad, but that
he will make others bad as well.35
Prodicus, perhaps flattered by Socrates’s ironic praise, takes the bait and asserts
that Simonides means “bad” (κακόν) when he says ‘hard’ (χαλεπὸν). Simonides
is thus made to censure Pittacus for saying something absurd, that it is bad to be
good. In fact, Prodicus understands Simonides to be censuring Pittacus for failing
to distinguish words properly (341c6−9). That is, Prodicus understands Simonides
to be concerned with his own area of expertise, a theme I will come back to in
the second part of the parody. Protagoras is incredulous, and rightly so. Indeed,
an absurd implication of Socrates’s reconceptualizing of “hard” would be that
the poet himself would be saying in his own voice that becoming good is bad,
a claim hardly less outrageous than what Pittacus is made to say. In response to
Protagoras, Socrates joins forces with the sophist and abandons Prodicus, claiming that the latter was “only joking” and “trying to test [Protagoras’s] ability to
defend his own account” (341d6−9). Socrates proceeds to prove that Simonides
did not mean “bad” by ‘hard’ by quoting the next line of the poem: “God alone
can have this privilege” (341e3). Socrates’s introduction of this line has several
implications. First, Prodicus must be wrong, since Simonides is shown to mean that
it is not merely hard but impossible for a human being to be good and remain that
way indefinitely. To become good temporarily is, on this reading, hard but possible.
Second, Protagoras’s objection is now answered, since virtue is the province of the
gods and hardly a trivial matter. Third, Simonides’s position is now set in opposition to Hesiod’s claim as well. Socrates thus ups the ante on the eristic dynamics
of the debate and scores a victory over both Protagoras and Prodicus.
Socrates surely wins, but what has he won? Through a series of shifting allegiances both to persons (Simonides, Hesiod, Protagoras, and Prodicus) and
to claims (Simonides agrees with Hesiod, Simonides means “bad” when he says
‘hard’), he has scored victories at the expense of Protagoras and Prodicus.36 He
of the depiction of Prodicus’s short speech in which he makes four distinctions in rapid succession:
impartially and equally; debate and eristics; respect and praise; being cheered and being pleased
(337a−c). It is surely part of the joke at Prodicus’s expense that, when Socrates and Hippocrates arrive,
they find him still in bed wrapped up in several blankets while his booming voice caused an echo that
“blurred what was being said” (319a1−2).
34
See LSJ, s.v. III. Both Plato and Aristotle use ‘δεινός’ to mean “too clever” as in “clever, but
lacking real content or value.”
35
In questioning Hippocrates about his eagerness to become Protagoras’s pupil, it becomes quickly
clear to Socrates that the boy has no clear idea what he is getting himself into. Socrates rebukes him
in the strongest terms for risking his most precious possession, his soul, by entrusting it to a sophist—
without knowing what a sophist is—and to the sophists’ teachings—without knowing whether these
are harmful or beneficial (313a−314c).
36
Frede (“The Impossibility of Perfection,” 736n19) describes Socrates treatment of the two
sophists as “naughty.”
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operates by setting argumentative traps for both Protagoras and Prodicus and thus
can be said to be arguing in bad faith. Indeed, his parody of eristic interpretation
has exactly the same faults as Protagoras’s more serious version. First, like Protagoras’s interpretation, Socrates’s parody is epideictic, showing that he is superior to
Protagoras and Prodicus, reputedly wise men, at their own games. Second, like
Protagoras, Socrates’s attitude toward the text seems mercenary, despite the fact
that he uses the text as a way to defend its author. He too plucks passages out of
context and suggests ways of understanding the text that he himself is not committed to. Indeed, Socrates makes claims about the text that very quickly he rescinds.
He merely uses the text to his own advantage in the eristic game against the two
sophists. Thus, while it may seem like a minimal principle of charity is operative
here, Socrates is employing no such thing. Third, like Protagoras, Socrates does
not say anything at all about the content of the lines he quotes concerning what
it is, or means, to be good. No positive view on the nature of virtue has been
advanced or defended. All we know is that Simonides, Pittacus, and Hesiod have
three different views on the matter. Further, Socrates goes beyond Protagoras
in refusing even to pretend to be serious about the details of his interpretation.
While Protagoras earns a hearty round of applause, Socrates is met with silence.
By exposing the eristic game in this way, he is ruining it for everyone.

3.2 Socrates’s Parody of Parasitic Interpretation (342a−347a)
In the second part of the parody, Socrates attacks a different sort of sophistic
interpretation—what I call parasitic interpretation—which uses the fame of the
poem as an implicit premise in an argumentum ad verecundiam, an argument from
authority. While eristic interpretation might have been something reserved for
specialist sophists, parasitic interpretation was a strategy of argumentation in much
wider use.37 Socrates first presents his hypothesis about the poem (342a−343c),
namely, that Simonides’s purpose is to win philosophical fame by deliberately
attacking Pittacus’s famous maxim; he then articulates what is essentially the Socratic philosophical position through a tortured reading of the text of the poem
(343c−347a). Socrates gives a very long speech, thereby temporarily abandoning
his own methodological commitment to question and answer and the agreed upon
procedure with Protagoras.
In formulating his hypothesis about Simonides’s poem, Socrates puts philosophy
front and center. Indeed, the very first word Socrates uses in his explanation of the
ode is ‘philosophy’ (342a7), and in articulating his hypothesis, Socrates suggests
that the Spartans harbor a secret cult of philosophers and that their superiority
to the world consists in their wisdom, a fact that they are very anxious to conceal
(342a7−d4). Their anxiety to hide the genuine source of their superiority accounts
for Spartans having exactly the opposite reputation: unsophisticated warriors who
are obsessed with exercising and have cauliflower ears from wrestling too much.
The particularly Spartan mode of philosophical expression consists of “pithy,
memorable sayings,” and Socrates even goes so far as to attribute the inscriptions

See Halliwell, “The Subjection of Muthos to Logos,” 94−98.
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on the oracle at Delphi to them (343a7−b3). As Socrates puts it, the “characteristic style of ancient philosophy was laconic brevity” (343b4−5), and one must see
Pittacus’s saying as falling within this tradition. Socrates’s thesis about the poem
is that Simonides had the intention of refuting Pittacus in composing his poem,
comparing the poet to a wrestler trying to beat the best: ambitious for philosophical
fame, Simonides attacked a well-known saying from a reputedly wise man.
There are several things to notice in Socrates’s presentation of his hypothesis.
First, Socrates makes the poem out to be about philosophy, his own area of proficiency, and indeed makes Simonides out to be a practitioner of the elenchus (see
344b3−5 for an explicit reference). This is no different from Prodicus’s earlier
claim that the poem is about the precise use of words. While Prodicus’s claim may
have been equally implausible, the elaborate back story about the secret Spartan
cults to which Socrates resorts makes his suggestion more ludicrous. Recall too
that Protagoras had claimed that a whole host of reputed wise men from the past
were secretly sophists: poets like Homer, Hesiod, and Simonides; cult religious
figures, like Orpheus and Musaeus; musicians, like Agathocles and Pythoclides;
and even athletes, like Iccus and Herodicus (316c−e). In claiming Simonides
for philosophy, Socrates can be seen as both rejecting and mocking Protagoras’s
claim. Second, in the course of describing philosophical style, Socrates attributes
his own methodological preference for brevity of expression to the ancients, even
while he is in the process of giving a long speech. Third, the tone of this passage
is clearly comic and thus sets the stage for the comedic defense of the thesis the
passage formulates. Contra Frede, there is no sense in which we find a tone shift at
this juncture from comic playfulness to serious philology, or to serious philosophy
for that matter.
In defending this hypothesis about Simonides’s intention in writing the poem
(343c−347a), Socrates articulates a Socratic picture of the human condition.
Frede, summing up Socrates’s “serious” interpretation, finds no fewer than four
core Socratic theses:
Socrates’ interpretation of Simonides’ poem contains (even if it is achieved by hook
or crook) some serious Socratic/Platonic tenets: (1) that man never is good but only
becomes good (i.e. temporarily), (2) that therefore a median state must be regarded
as acceptable, (3) that virtue is knowledge and the only real disaster is its loss, (4)
that no-one does evil voluntarily. (Frede, “The Impossibility of Perfection,” 746)

My aim here is not to deny that Socrates uses Simonides’s poem to articulate these
four Socratic claims. Nor is my aim merely to show that Socrates distorts the text
in order to do so, since Frede, McCoy, and Pappas all agree that Socrates does
this. Rather, I want to argue that the distortions can be understood as part of a
parodic strategy, whereby Socrates implicitly criticizes parasitic interpretation. If
this is in fact what Socrates does in his interpretation, since we know that he does
not consider the poets to be moral experts, we can safely conclude that the interpretation is a parody. Socrates’s parasitic interpretation breaks up into five parts:
an introduction (343c−344a); the articulation of the claim that “man never is good
but only becomes good” (344b−344e); the articulation of the claim that “virtue
is knowledge and the only real disaster is its loss” (344e−345c); the articulation
of the claim that “no-one does evil voluntarily” (345c−346c); and the articulation
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of the claim that “a median state must be regarded as acceptable” (346c−347e).
First, in order to set up his reading, Socrates provides a tortured reading of the
first line of Simonides’s poem:
ἀνδρ’ ἀγαθὸν μὲν ἀλαθέως γενέσθαι χαλεπόν.
It is hard to become a man truly good. (339b1)

He first reads the μὲν as anticipating a contrast with Pittacus’s maxim, indeed, as
being nonsensical unless it anticipates such a contrast (343c7−d6). Since we do
not have the lines between the first few and the reference to Pittacus, we do not
know what the μὲν might have actually contrasted in the poem.38 In fact, the μὲν
need not anticipate a contrast at all.39 Socrates proceeds as though there were no
intervening lines, looks for a contrasting δέ, and finds one introducing Pittacus’s
maxim (οὐδ’). Not only is it very unlikely that the contrasting δέ would come seven
lines later, it is very unusual for μέν to anticipate οὐδέ.40 Socrates’s move here is
meant to show that the intention to criticize Pittacus is present in the very first
line and shapes the entire poem. His next move is puzzling. Socrates claims that
the placement of ἀλαθέως is a case of hyperbaton and proceeds to understand the
“truly” as modifying “hard” as opposed to “good,” on the grounds that “it would
be silly and unworthy of Simonides” to suggest a difference between genuine
and false goods (343e2); rather, Simonides must be understood as saying that
becoming good is truly difficult. On Socrates’s placement, the “truly” supposedly
anticipates a contrast with Pittacus, thereby confirming his overall view. This is
clearly an implausible reading of the line, given the natural sense dictated by the
word order and the fact that the poem then elaborates what ‘truly good’ means in
the next line.41 It is particularly bizarre since Socrates is perfectly happy in other
places to draw a distinction between genuine and seeming goodness.42 But if the
contrast between genuine and seeming goodness is what Simonides has in mind,
then the μὲν was likely answered by a δέ connected to seeming good.43 This would
undermine the idea that Simonides has Pittacus in mind throughout.44 Thus,
Socrates could not conclude his introduction with the claim that “the overall struc38
According to long-standing scholarly consensus, the original poem consisted of four stanzas,
with ten lines each, and the lines quoted at 339b1−3 are the first three lines of the first stanza, of
which the rest is missing. The lines referring to Pittacus are thought to be the first lines of the second
stanza, which is nearly complete. See Taylor, Plato: Protagoras, 142; Donlan, “Simonides Fr. 4d and P.
Oxy. 2432,” 69. Thus, on this reconstruction of the poem, the contrasted δέ, if there was one, was likely
to be found in the first stanza (Donlan, “Simonides Fr. 4d and P. Oxy. 2432,” 81). However, Beresford
(“Nobody’s Perfect”) has proposed a new arrangement of the text of the poem, whereby it has only
three stanzas of ten lines each. The upshot of the view is that the entirety of the poem can be found
in the Prt. Denyer (Plato: Protagoras, 147−48) has followed suit. Even if Beresford (“Nobody’s Perfect,”
242−43) is right about his reconstruction, the initial μέν still does not look all the way forward to a
contrast with Pittacus’s maxim. Either way, Socrates is forcing the μέν to do something it is not in fact
doing in the poem.
39
There is an emphatic use: see Denniston, The Greek Particles, s.v. μέν I.
40
See Denniston, The Greek Particles, s.v. μέν III.I; s.v. δέ III.A.5; and s.v. οὐδέ I.I.i.
41
Demos, Lyric Quotation, 22.
42
See Frede, “The Impossibility of Perfection,” 741.
43
See Donlan, “Simonides Fr. 4d and P. Oxy. 2432,” 80−81.
44
If Simonides has anyone in mind throughout, it is likely Scopas, the actual addressee of the
poem. Bowra (“Simonides and Scopas,” 232) speculates that the first stanza contained a direct reference to Scopas: see also Parry (“An Interpretation of Simonides 4 (Diehl),” 298), who sees the poem
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ture and intention of the ode . . . is from beginning to end a refutation [elenchus]
of Pittacus’s maxim” (344b3−5). Socrates has managed to turn Simonides into a
kind of Socratic philosopher, one who refutes the claims of others. In doing so,
he provides an authoritative source to justify his own activity.
In the second part (344b−344e), Socrates asks us to imagine that Simonides
is making a speech to Pittacus, insisting that to become good is hard but possible
for a brief time, while to be good is impossible for human beings—only possible
for the gods. While this sentiment, in its perfectly general form, may have been
shared by Simonides and Socrates, Socrates understands goodness and virtue
strictly in terms of knowledge. Indeed, the assumption that virtue is knowledge colors
Socrates’s interpretation throughout. He gives the good man, in Frede’s words,
a “decidedly Socratic character.”45 Indeed, for the rest of the interpretation, we
see Socrates bypassing a more natural understanding of Simonides’s meaning for
one that suits his own view. In interpreting the next lines of the poem, Socrates
introduces his famous technē analogy:
ἄνδρα δ᾽ οὐκ ἔστι μὴ οὐ κακὸν ἔμμεναι,
ὃν [ἂν] ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ καθέλῃ.
But that man inevitably is bad
whom irresistible misfortune throws down.(344c4−5)

An irresistible misfortune, or ἀμήχανος συμφορὰ, happens, by chance as it were, to
someone.46 In asking whom such a misfortune could possibly throw down, Socrates
suggests that it is someone who is resourceful and prone to resist (εὐμήχανος) that
is thrown down. He adduces the examples of the pilot, the farmer, and the doctor,
all analogues to the good man by virtue of their possession of craft-knowledge,
or technē.
In the third part (344e−345c), Socrates quotes Simonides again, as though the
poet were continuing his refutation of Pittacus:
πράξας μὲν γὰρ εὖ πᾶς ἀνὴρ ἀγαθός,
κακὸς δ᾽ εἰ κακῶς.
Faring well, every man is good.
Bad, faring ill. (344e7−8)

Socrates approaches this line by asking, “what does it mean to fare well in letters;
what makes a man good at them?” (345a1−2). His answer, “clearly the learning
of letters,” leads him to the conclusion that the only “real kind of faring ill is the
as a consolation to Scopas for “some specific disappointment about which we know nothing.” The
practice of writing poems for wealthy and distinguished gentlemen simply did not permit criticisms
of any kind. Indeed, praise would have been much more likely, and it has even been suggested that
the poem is an encomium to Scopas: see Dickie, “The Argument and Form of Simonides 542 PMG,”
21−22, 32−33. Regarding Simonides’s purpose, Smyth (Greek Melic Poets, 311−12) goes so far as to
restrict the possibilities thus: “[I]t is uncertain whether the poet is endeavoring to free Scopas from
an accusation based on some specific act of injustice, or to furnish him with an ethical code that may
excuse a persistent policy of oppression.”
45
Frede, “The Impossibility of Perfection,” 741.
46
See Donlan (“Simonides Fr. 4d and P. Oxy. 2432,” 84−85), who claims that the usage of ἀμήχανος
“always signifies someone or something against which or over which the subject has no resource or
control.”
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loss of knowledge” that comes through sickness, old age, etc. (345a2, b5). This
move clarifies both what it means to be bad—to be ignorant—and what sort of
irresistible misfortunes cause the loss of knowledge. On this account, to be a good
man would involve being fully insulated from such circumstances that cause the
loss of knowledge, and this is only possible for the gods. Though the sentiment
here is clearly Socratic,47 the connection to Simonides’s poem is tenuous at best.
In the fourth part (345c−346c), after quoting without comment a passage
where Simonides rejects the quest for a blameless man (see discussion below), he
quotes another section of the poem:
πάντας δ᾽ ἐπαίνημι καὶ φιλέω
ἑκὼν ὅστις ἕρδῃ
μηδὲν αἰσχρόν· ἀνάγκῃ δ᾽ οὐδὲ θεοὶ μάχονται·
All who do no wrong willingly
I praise and love.
Necessity not even the gods can resist. (345d3−5)

Socrates takes this line to imply that no-one does wrong willingly, even though
Simonides seems implicitly to allow for the possibility; by praising those who do no
wrong willingly, he surely makes the willing commission of both right and wrong
actions possible. This section contains the most egregious misreading, and even
Frede admits that this section is “the least serious” and that “it is out of the question that Simonides shared Socrates’ enlightened view.”48 Socrates, contra Frede,
seems certain not only that Simonides held this view, but that it was widely held
by wise men generally:
Simonides was not so uneducated as to say that he praised all who did nothing bad
willingly, as if there were anyone who willingly did bad things. I am pretty sure that
none of the wise men thinks that any human being willingly makes mistakes or willingly does anything wrong or bad. They know very well that anyone who does anything
wrong or bad does so involuntarily. (345d6−e4)

Socrates’s interpretation reads ‘ἑκὼν,’ “willingly,” with “I praise and love”—another instance of hyperbaton—so that Simonides willingly praises those who do
no wrong.49 Again, there is no question of this being a serious interpretation, in
the sense of being an honest account of what the poem might plausibly mean.
Socrates simply imposes his own views on the text. Indeed, Socrates takes the opportunity to take a partial swipe at Simonides for writing so many poems in praise
of tyrants (346b−c). Notice here too that the appeal to authority is overt. All wise
men, including Simonides, share Socrates’s view on the impossibility of willingly
doing wrong; therefore, it must be true. Socrates does not even pretend to argue
for the position.

47
For the problem posed by the loss of knowledge, see Symp. 207e–208a; for that posed by forgetfulness, see Rep. 486c−d; on the need for reminders, see Phdr. 276d, 277e–278a.
48
Frede, “The Impossibility of Perfection,” 745−46.
49
Demos (Lyric Quotation, 28) seems to think that hyperbaton is precluded by the word order, but
this seems to be too strong a position.
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In the last part of the parody (346c−347e), Socrates concludes, given the
impossibility of being good, that a median state between good and bad must be
regarded as acceptable and praiseworthy. There are several relevant lines:
τοὔνεκεν οὔ ποτ᾽ ἐγὼ τὸ μὴ γενέσθαι δυνατὸν
διζήμενος κενεὰν ἐς ἄπρακτον ἐλπίδα μοῖραν αἰῶνος βαλέω,
πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, εὐρυεδοῦς ὅσοι καρπὸν αἰνύμεθα χθονός·
ἐπί θ᾽ ὑμῖν εὑρὼν ἀπαγγελέω.
Therefore never shall I seek for the impossible
Cast away my life’s lot on empty hope, a quixotic quest
For a blameless man among those who reap
The broad earth’s fruit,
But if I find him, you will have my report. (345c6−11)50
...
ἔμοιγ᾽ ἐξαρκεῖ ὃς ἂν μὴ κακὸς ᾖ
μηδ᾽ ἄγαν ἀπάλαμνος, εἰδώς τ᾽ ὀνησίπολιν δίκαν ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ·
οὔ μιν ἐγὼ μωμήσομαι—
οὐ γάρ εἰμι φιλόμωμος—51
τῶν γὰρ ἠλιθίων ἀπείρων γενέθλα.
Enough for me a man who is not bad
Nor too intractable, who knows civic Justice, a sound man
I shall not blame him
For I am not fond of blame
Infinite the tribe of fools. (346c3−8)
...
πάντα τοι καλά, τοῖσί τ᾽ αἰσχρὰ μὴ μέμεικται.
All is fair in which foul is not mixed. (346c11)

The final line would seem to indicate that Simonides think that the mere absence
of badness, or shamefulness, αἰσχρὰ, is sufficient for goodness. Indeed, this seems
to be verified by the prior line, “[e]nough for me a man who is not bad [μὴ κακὸς].”
But Socrates dismisses this idea as “laughable in many ways” (346d2) and claims
that Simonides instead means that a “sound man,” or ὑγιὴς ἀνήρ, is one who is in
a median state that is free from blame.52 When Simonides suggests that he will
give his “report” if he happens to find πανάμωμον ἄνθρωπον, “a blameless man,”
Socrates takes him to mean that he will never praise anyone as fully good, but that
he is “happy with a someone in the median state who does no evil” (346d2−3).
50
Toward the end, Socrates’s interpretation loses a bit of focus. He mentions these lines, but he
neglects them for over a Stephanus page, instead choosing to quote and interpret the lines relating
to praise and unwillingly doing wrong.
51
The text is indented thus because there has been no agreement on whether this line is actually
part of the poem or Socrates’s interpolation. For those who think that it is the latter, see e.g. Burnet,
Platonis Opera; Taylor, Plato: Protagoras; Denyer, Plato: Protagoras; and Beresford, “Nobody’s Perfect.”
Those who think that the line is part of the poem include, e.g. Lamb, Plato: Laches, Protagoras, Meno,
Euthydemus; Bowra, Greek Lyric Poetry; and Croiset, Platon: Protagoras. Since nothing in my own argument
hangs on this point, I take no stand here.
52
It would not be far off to translate ‘ὑγιὴς’ as “healthy” (see LSJ, s.v.), and, on a Socratic conception, the sound or healthy man has perhaps been treated by what Socrates earlier describes as “a
physician of the soul” (313e2).
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Both Frede and McCoy point to the Symposium as an analogue for what Socrates
has in mind in talking of the median state,53 but it seems to me that the idea of
human wisdom in the Apology would do just as well. There Socrates distinguishes
among three states: divine wisdom, human wisdom, and human ignorance. The
first is inaccessible, the second is a possible human achievement—Socrates’s selfknowledge—and the last is the blameworthy state in which most Athenians live
their lives (22e−23b; 29a−b).54 Further, in the Apology, Socrates associates this
median state, his human wisdom, with never having willingly done evil (25e−26a;
33a; 37a–b.).55 Thus construed, the median state is indeed praiseworthy, and, as
Socrates’s description of his quest in the Apology attests, the search for a man with
divine wisdom is (as the poem puts it) “a quixotic quest,” and the tribe of those
ignorant of their own ignorance is infinite (21a−22d).
Unless Socrates takes Simonides to mean something like the Socratic picture just
sketched, it hardly makes any sense that he would dedicate an entire poem to the
refutation and censure of Pittacus. The latter’s claim is, after all, hardly evidence
that he fails Simonides’s median state test in its literal version. Only on the Socratic
interpretation does Pittacus deserve to be refuted and rebuked. For in claiming
that to be good is hard, Pittacus implies both that divine wisdom is possible and,
by implication, that he possesses some of it. Thus, Socrates concludes by saying
to Pittacus, with Simonides’s voice, “[I]f you spoke something even moderately
[μέσως] reasonable and true, Pittacus, I would never censure you. But the fact
is that you have lied blatantly yet with verisimilitude about extremely important
matters, and for that I do censure you” (346e4−347a3).56 In censuring Pittacus
in this way for failing to speak the truth, Simonides (on Socrates’s interpretation)
thereby endorses his own view as the true one. But since it is Socrates’s view that
Simonides is made to endorse, then it is Socrates’s view whose truth is endorsed
by Simonides. In this way, Socrates makes Simonides out to be a witness for his
view of the human condition, that is, he employs the poet’s authority as a way to
endorse his own view.

Frede, “The Impossibility of Perfection,” 743−45; McCoy, “Socrates on Simonides,” 357.
The notion of the neither good nor bad in the Lysis might also be seen as describing a similar
picture (216c–218c). In the context of trying to find a conceptual apparatus to account for friendship, Socrates claims, as an implication of the claim that the neither good nor bad is friend of the
good because of the presence of some bad, that “those who are already wise no longer love wisdom,
whether they are gods or men. Nor do those love it who are so ignorant that they are bad, for no bad
and stupid man loves wisdom. There remain only those who have this bad thing, ignorance, but have
not yet been made ignorant and stupid by it. They are conscious of not knowing what they don’t know”
(218a−b). This provides a picture of three levels: the wise gods, the philosophers, and the ignorant.
Again, the median state is praiseworthy. Thus, pace Frede, one does not need the context and concepts
of the Symp. in order to make sense of the Socratic picture presented in the Prt.
55
As an anonymous reviewer rightly points out, this evidence is ambiguous, since on the Socratic
picture, no one ever does evil willingly. For my modest purposes here, however, it is enough that Socrates
associates the median state with not doing evil. To speculate as to how Socrates’s claim differentiates
him from his accusers in the Ap., for example, is beyond the scope of this paper.
56
Despite Socrates’s use of vocatives, it is quite clear that these lines are not addressed to Pittacus.
They are rather addressed, as the entire poem is, to Scopas, and, based on the principle that poets did
not criticize their patrons, it seems safe to infer that, on the picture presented by Simonides, Scopas
is praiseworthy.
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Socrates’s methodology here is not, as Pappas would have it, a radical application of the principle of charity, whereby “[i]n order to derive true statements from
a poem, Socrates is positively compelled to attribute his beliefs to every author.”57
The clearest evidence for this is that the purported methodology contradicts both
the content of the view that Simonides is made to endorse and the practice of
philosophical dialogue in which Socrates engages. For Pappas’s view entails that
Socrates is so secure about the truth of his own views that he will impute them
onto any poem whatsoever. But the content of the view about which Socrates is
supposed to be so confident entails that no one should ever be that confident in
the truth of one’s own views. Thus, the philosophical content of Socrates’s claims,
which involves uncertainty about the truth of one’s beliefs, does not square with
the methodology that Pappas attributes to him, since this methodology would
involve precisely such certainty. In fact, on Pappas’s view, given his insistence
that the treatment of the poem “strikingly resembles his treatment of live interlocutors,”58 it would turn out that no real living dialogue is justified either, since
everyone would be better off if Socrates just spoke for his interlocutors, saying on
their behalf whatever he thinks is true.
In my view, Socrates’s parasitic interpretation parodies some of the very same
features that his parody of eristic interpretation did. First, Socrates’s parody is
an epideictic speech, showing that he is superior to the sophists both at giving
speeches and at parasitic interpretation. Indeed, immediately following Socrates’s
interpretation, Hippias wants to give one, claiming that he “has quite a nice talk on
it [himself]” which he is eager to present (347a6−b2). We are meant to imagine
that Hippias’s speech, though perhaps less obviously ludicrous, would be equally
self-aggrandizing. Indeed, Hippias’s enthusiasm and eagerness to present his own
speech seems to be evidence for the sophistic practice of parasitic interpretation.
Second, Socrates has a mercenary attitude toward the text. Socrates’s interpretation does not hold itself to even any minimum standards of adequacy. Where the
overt content points in one direction, Socrates understands the text to indicate
something quite different. What we see in this parody is Socrates distorting the
text to fit his own preconceived notions of virtue, goodness, and human success;
in particular, he see in the poem various expressions of the basic claim that virtue is knowledge. Third, Socrates uses Simonides as a vehicle for the expression
of his own ideas, that is, he makes it seems like Simonides is a philosopher who
engages in refutation, thinks that virtue is knowledge, and endorses a Socratic
picture of the human condition. Socrates does not really comment on the content
of the view that he is articulating, except to say that the lines of the poem can be
understood in the self-serving way that he unpacks them. Socrates’s interpretation
is parasitic on Simonides’s fame, and the only role for the poet is to add gravitas
and legitimacy to the Socratic view. Fourth, Socrates does not seem genuinely
concerned with the truth of his own claims. He fails to test and evaluate them;
instead, he articulates them in a long speech without comment. In short, there
is no philosophical dialogue or dialectic. Socrates keeps his own ideas at a disPappas, “Socrates’ Charitable Treatment,” 256.
Pappas, “Socrates’ Charitable Treatment,” 254.
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tance, as it were, only engaging them qua meaning of Simonides’s poem. Even if
the picture is itself Socratic and meant (parodically) to persuade the group, it is
arrived in a methodologically suspect way, and those who are convinced of it by
Socrates’s speech will also arrive at it in a methodologically suspect way. Surely it
matters how one arrives at a philosophical position.

3.3 Philosophical Interpretation
The point of the parody is to enact, as it were, certain criticisms of sophistic
interpretation of poetry, and we are now in a position to formulate the parodic
criticisms and to articulate the underlying ideal of interpretation. In my view, the
parody puts forth three basic criticisms, and, in light of these three criticisms, we
can formulate three criteria for the underlying ideal: First, sophistic interpretation
either implicitly or explicitly appeals to the authority of the poet as a way either to
win fame for oneself by showing oneself superior to an allegedly wise man (eristic)
or to lend persuasive weight to a claim or set of claims (parasitic). That is, to approach a poem thinking that a poet is an authority figure is either to be interested
only in self-aggrandizement—which is, on the Socratic picture, characteristic of
pretension to wisdom and never justified59—or to think that the poet’s authority
bears some weight in the establishment of a claim—which is simply false, both
from a methodological perspective and from the fact that the poets do not in fact
possess the relevant authoritative knowledge.60 Thus, the ideal of interpretation
would require remaining indifferent to the poet qua authority. Second, sophistic
interpretation distorts the text under discussion either to make it say something
implausible or contradictory (eristic) or to make it say what the interpreter wants
it to say for his own persuasive purposes (parasitic). In neither case does the interpreter approach the text of poem as even potentially possessing any independent
content of philosophical significance. Contrary to this, the ideal of interpretation would involve a plausible reconstruction of the poem’s intended meaning
so that a philosophical view may be formulated. Third, sophistic interpretation
merely elaborates the supposed contradiction (eristic) or meaning (parasitic) of
the poem, without genuinely attempting to assess the truth of the content of the
claims under discussion. By contrast, the ideal of interpretation would necessitate
a critical assessment, that is, the interpreter would test and investigate the truth
of the view as formulated.
To sum up, the ideal of interpretation would thus involve the satisfaction of
three basic criteria. The interpreter would be required to:

59
If one actually possessed wisdom, then self-praise or self-congratulation might be justified, since
wisdom is the greatest good, but the wise person would presumably never want or need to exaggerate
his or her abilities.
60
Demos (Lyric Quotation, 36) notes that the poets do not come in for the sort of criticism they
normally get from Plato. The core problem, she avers, is with the majority and their treatment of the
poets as authorities. Even though it is left unstated, surely this attitude is mistaken because the poets
are not authorities.
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[1]	Remain indifferent to the poet qua authority;
[2]	Attempt a plausible reconstruction of the poem’s intended meaning so that a
philosophical view is formulated;61
[3] Critically assess and test that view.

Notice the similarity between these three criteria and Socrates’s own practice of
philosophical conversation: Socrates is never impressed by his interlocutor’s status
as an authority figure, and he always questions his interlocutor, helps him formulate
a philosophical position, and then subjects his view to a rigorous critique.62 As I
have reconstructed the ideal of interpretation, it is clear that an interpretation thus
has to be philosophical if it is to have any value, that is, it has to be an imitation of
philosophical dialectic. Given that these criteria emerged through dissatisfaction
with a particular interpretation, we might say that they reflect standards internal
to interpretation itself.63 One might object here that the second [2] and third [3]
criteria are clearly external to interpretation, but recall that it was Protagoras, not
Socrates, who wanted to use the interpretation of poetry as a way of discussing the
nature of virtue and who introduced logical consistency as a constraint on one’s
interpretation. Thus, even he, at least implicitly, is committed to there being a
philosophical view contained in the poem (as per [2]) that can be critically examined (as per [3]). To this, one might add that parasitic interpretation assumes that
an audience will uncritically take the poet’s meaning to be true. These criteria are
also philosophical in another way, insofar as they require certain discourse-enabling
dispositions. In the Gorgias, Socrates describes the ideal interlocutor as possessing
three virtues: “knowledge, good will, and frankness” (487a2–3).64 Leaving aside
the first for a moment, we might say that the second criterion [2] requires the
virtue of good will, since the interpreter has to be both willing to help elaborate

61
One might object to this formulation on the grounds that it seems to leave open the possibility
that one might read philosophical content into the poem, as opposed to discovering it in the poem.
My thanks to an anonymous reviewer for bringing this objection to my attention. I have phrased the
point in this way in order to leave open the possibility that there may be implicit philosophical content,
though no overt philosophical content. Just as Socrates’s interlocutors implicitly commit themselves
to philosophical positions, so too might poems have implicit philosophical commitments, which may
need to be teased out. That said, I do not deny that there may be poems that contain no philosophical
content whatsoever. However, as I mean to suggest by my discussion of Archilochus in section 5 below,
there may be fewer of these philosophically barren poems than one might have thought.
62
Pappas (“Socrates’ Charitable Treatment,” 254) thinks that Socrates’s actual method “strikingly resembles his treatment of live interlocutors,” in that he asks questions of an unexpected sort
and reaches conclusions that the interlocutor does not intend, while insisting that the conclusion is
in fact what the interlocutor really thinks. McCoy (“Socrates on Simonides,” 359) similarly claims
that Socrates’s interpretation engages in a “dialogue with the poet,” on the grounds that Socrates
tries to “build upon and respond to what Simonides thinks.” As far as I can tell, Socrates never even
broaches the question of what Simonides thinks. As I will argue in more detail below, philosophical
interpretation will precisely have to do what Socrates does not do in his parody, namely, engage in a
kind of dialogue with the poem.
63
Finding philosophical standards implicitly internal to other practices is not an untypical Socratic
maneuver. Consider, for example, the treatment of rhetoric in the Phdr.; see Trivigno, “Putting Unity
in Its Place.”
64
ἐπιστήμην τε καὶ εὔνοιαν καὶ παρρησίαν. In this passage in the Grg., Socrates is praising Callicles
for possessing these three qualities, but it is clear from the context that this praise is ironic and from
Callicles’s behavior throughout the conversation that he actually lacks all three. See my discussion of
this passage in Trivigno, “Paratragedy in Plato’s Gorgias,” 95−96, 95n36.
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and open to countenancing another’s view. The third [3] may be said to require
the virtue of frankness, when the interpreter honestly and vigilantly pursues lines
of criticism to test the adequacy of the view. Regarding the first virtue, knowledge,
we can see that in play here as well, if we understand the knowledge criterion in
the minimal, Socratic sense of knowledge of human ignorance. The interpreter
could be said to embody knowledge of her own ignorance in [2], in her willingness to countenance the view of another, and knowledge of the ignorance of the
poet in both [1] and [3], in being blind to the poet’s authority and critical of his
view. Understanding the knowledge criterion in this sense has the further upshot
of dovetailing with the Socratic picture that the parodic interpretation actually
endorses. In addition, satisfying these criteria will require skill in both constructive
and critical argumentation and an overall orientation toward the truth, ensuring
the telic structure of philosophical interpretation.
It is clear that philosophical interpretation, reflecting standards internal to
interpretation itself, escapes the problem implicit in sophistic interpretation.
However, it is not yet clear whether it is in general desirable to engage in such an
interpretation, if one subjects interpretation to standards external to interpretation,
in particular, to those of Socratic philosophical dialectic. We must see, in short,
whether this model of interpretation can withstand the strong rebuke of interpretation that Socrates articulates after his parody is complete. If not, then the notion
of a defensible kind of interpretation will be a non-starter. I turn to this task in
the fifth section of the paper, after elaborating the critique in the next section.

4. socrates’s critique of interpretation
(347c−348a)
Socrates ends his interpretation of Simonides’s poem with a stunning and sweeping rebuke of interpretation of poetry. In order to get clear on the main points
of Socrates’s attack, it is worth quoting the passage in full:
Discussing poetry [τὸ περὶ ποιήσεως διαλέγεσθαι] strikes me as no different from the
second-rate drinking parties of the agora crowd. These people, largely uneducated and
unable to entertain themselves over their wine by using their own voices to generate
conversation, pay premium prices for flute-girls and rely on the extraneous voice of the
reed flute as background music for their parties. But when well-educated men drink
together, you will not see girls playing the flute or the lyre or dancing, but a group
that knows how to get together without this childish nonsense, conversing civilly no
matter how heavily they are drinking.65 Ours is such a group, if indeed it consists of
men such as most of us claim to be, and it should require no extraneous voices, not
65
Part of Frede’s justification (“The Impossibility of Perfection,” 747) for seeing Symp. as a crucial
background text for understanding Prt. comes from the similarity of the description here to the actual
events of the Symp. While there may very well be an inter-dialogue reference, Frede’s assertion of a later
hand lacks sufficient support. Frede (“The Impossibility of Perfection,” 748) claims that the “references to the Symposium and the ‘serious exegesis’ (343c6−47e) are later additions.” Plato’s purpose,
in her view, was to provide a “caveat against reading the [Protagoras] in a too optimistic way,” to assert
the precarious state of human knowledge, and to use the account of the ascendance to truth from
the Symp. in order to fill a gap in the Prt.’s treatment of education (“The Impossibility of Perfection,”
749−50). Though her developmental thesis is weakly supported, Frede is surely right that, insofar as
the interpretation passage provides information on the Socratic picture, it moderates the optimism
one might find in the Prt. based only on the passages surrounding the hedonic calculus.
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even of poets, who cannot be questioned on what they say. When a poet is brought
up in a discussion, almost everyone has a different opinion of what he means, and
they wind up arguing about something they can never finally decide. The best people
avoid such discussions and rely on their own voices to entertain themselves and to
test each other. These people should be our models. We should put the poets aside
and converse directly with each other, testing the truth and ourselves. (347c3−348a6)

The core of the passage is the ideal of “rely[ing] on [our] own voices,” from which
poetry distracts us. Socrates associates the introduction of “extraneous voices” with
the uneducated hoi polloi, while the truly noble and educated “rely on their own
voices to entertain themselves and to test each other.” As I see it, Socrates makes
three central and overlapping points in this passage.
The first point is that the poets “cannot be questioned on what they say.” This is
because they are present only through the words in their poems. The voice of the
poet, though distinctive and original, cannot respond to questioning and testing
and is thus in a certain sense inert.66 To have a proper voice, on Socrates’s view,
entails the ability to respond to philosophical questions. Thus, to replace one’s
own voice with the extraneous one of the poet is to take on a voice that does not
speak properly. As Griswold puts this point, “In the standard game of exegesis . . .
neither the exegete nor the author whose works are explained can be questioned
or refuted. Neither has his or her own voice or helps the other to find his or hers.”67
In short, there can be no living dialogue. This point is reminiscent of the critique
of writing in the Phaedrus, in which Socrates claims that writings cannot defend
themselves without their authors or respond when questioned (275e). The voice
of the poet will continue to say the same thing in a distinctively poetic and beautiful but philosophically unaccountable manner. One might add here that even
if one could question the poets on their poetry, it is not clear that they would do
any better than others at coming up with a coherent account, since as Socrates
famously claims in the Apology, it was, in his experience, the poets themselves who
were the worst at interpreting their own poetry (22b−c).
Second, because the poet’s meaning can never be settled, there is no strictly
correct interpretation and to argue about the proper interpretation of a poem
is to engage in an inquiry that one “can never finally decide.”68 The implications
of this are wide-ranging, since “almost everyone has a different opinion of what
[the poet] means.” This does not seem to be merely a question of the difficulty of
coming to the correct interpretation but rather of the impossibility that is endemic
to interpretation as such. Since the poets themselves are not sure what they mean,
interpretive claims about the poet’s meaning lack proper truth-conditions. It is
an open-ended endeavor with no clear termination point. One could spend one’s
entire life trying to determine the meaning of the works of Simonides and make
no real progress. Since there are more important philosophical questions, pursuing interpretive ones would seem to be a waste of time.
The third point is explicitly normative: since “the best people . . . rely on their
own voices to entertain themselves and to test each other,” and taking them as
Griswold, “Relying on Your Own Voice,” 291−92.
Griswold, “Relying on Your Own Voice,” 291.
68
Cf. Hp. Mi. 365c−d.
66
67
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our “models,” we “should . . . converse directly with each other, testing the truth
and ourselves.” I will dwell a bit longer on this point, both since it is the culmination of the other two and since it is not immediately obvious how to take it. Put
briefly, living philosophical dialogue is the way to test the truth of our claims
against others, and in doing so, to come closer to both knowledge of the topic
and knowledge of self. Philosophical dialectic, as practiced by Socrates, thus has
a necessary connection to knowledge and truth.69 Relying on the poet’s voice
distances oneself from the view under discussion and thus insulates one from
criticism and responsibility to the outcome of the conversation.70 In this way, one
is neither testing the truth nor oneself. Nor is one testing one’s opponent; this
is not inconsequential, since, as Griswold puts it, “to speak in one’s own voice is
closely linked to a receptiveness and responsiveness to the voice of others.”71 In
an obvious sense, the normativity here is methodological or epistemological, and,
in a sense, conditional. If we want to emulate the best and get at the truth, then
we should engage in philosophical dialogue. Of course, this implies that, if we
are at the moment not interested in emulating the best, or are not really looking
for the truth, then it seems perfectly fine to discuss poetry as a kind of harmless
entertainment. However, Socrates appears to be making a much stronger point,
that we should always emulate the best people, and that philosophical dialogue is
the way to do so. Thus, the point he makes is more broadly ethical or moral. The
“best” people are not merely the most successful seekers of knowledge because of
certain methodological and epistemological views; they are the best because they
are committed to the life of philosophical inquiry. Such commitment requires a
single-minded—almost superhuman—devotion to philosophical conversation:
notice that, on Socrates’s account, we should be engaging in such conversation
even when we are drinking at a party. The core underpinning of this view is the
claim, central to the dialogue, that virtue is knowledge. Being a good person involves
vigorously pursuing the truth and being open to Socratic testing, thus opening
up the possibility of both knowledge and self-knowledge.
To sum up, interpreting poetry is deficient on several counts: by relying on the
voice of the poet, we fail to test ourselves; by conducting a conversation with an
interlocutor, the poet, who cannot respond, we cut off the possibility of real dialogue; and by conducting an argument about a matter, the correct interpretation
of a poem, that is in principle undecidable, we cut off the possibility of truth. On
Griswold’s reading, these failures indicate an underlying moral ideal of discourse,
which expresses the virtues of self-sufficiency, in testing claims for oneself; of accountability, in holding one’s own claims to the standards of rational testing; and
of responsibility, in responding appropriately when the claims under discussion are

69
This is a large claim, which I will not defend here. At minimum, it should be uncontroversial
to claim that Socrates thinks dialectic to be the methodologically preferable way of examining philosophical issues, and such methodological superiority is plausibly connected to success in differentiating
true views from false ones.
70
Griswold (“Relying on Your Own Voice,” 289) claims that “Socrates tries to get Protagoras
to say what he thinks in order to force him to acquire a stake in the continuation and outcome of
philosophical dialogue.”
71
Griswold, “Relying on Your Own Voice,” 290.
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upheld or refuted.72 Since Socrates conceives of his recommendations as having
normative ethical force, then to waste one’s time interpreting poetry would be an
ethical failure. If these criticisms are seriously meant—given that Socrates subjects
interpretation to the standards of philosophical dialectic, there is no reason to
doubt it—then it is hard to see how Socrates’s own interpretation could be meant
seriously. It must, rather, be doing critical work as a parody.
Bracketing philosophical interpretation for the moment, these criticisms can
be seen as a direct challenge to Protagoras’s model of education and his sophistic conception of the interpretation of poetry. Recall that, for the sophist, “the
greatest part of a man’s education is to be clever about poetry [περὶ ἐπῶν δεινὸν
εἶναι]” (338e6−339a1) and that this cleverness encompasses four tasks: (1) to
understand what the poet means; (2) to understand what is composed correctly
and what not; (3) to know how to analyze a poem; and (4) to know how to give
an account in response to questions about the poem. If Socrates’s critique is right,
then (1) is impossible, (2) is to apply arbitrary and disingenuous standards, (3)
amounts to the ability to distort the text to suit one’s interpretive aim, and (4)
is nothing more than a facility in eristic argumentation.73 One might ask to what
end is cleverness about poetry aimed, or why, on the Protagorean model of education, it has such a prominent place. As we have seen, Protagoras’s aim in his
own interpretation was to bolster his own reputation. This is not incidental to,
but rather a core component of, Protagoras’s overall world-view. To establish an
authoritative reputation through public display is part of what it means both to be
virtuous and to hold a position of power in the city. In describing what he knows
and what he teaches, Protagoras highlights the management of one’s own affairs
as well as those of the city (318e−319a). The Protagorean model involves building
oneself up, in part through persuading others that one is virtuous. By contrast,
the Socratic model involves constantly breaking oneself down through dialectical
testing, examination, and inquiry—in short, through philosophy. It is to confront
one’s own ignorance again and again. Protagoras only wants to win and will only
engage in verbal disputes in which he already has the advantage; in refusing to
accede to Socrates’s request to give only short answers, he says, “I have had many
verbal contests [ἀγῶνα λόγων] with many people, and if I were to accede to your
request and do as my opponent demanded, I would not be thought superior to
anyone, nor would Protagoras be a name to be reckoned with among the Greeks”
(335a4−8). To put it bluntly, Protagoras is not interested in genuinely testing
himself, since, on his picture of virtue, nothing good can come of it.
When Protagoras says that he wants to question Socrates about virtue “transferred to the context of poetry” (339a4−6), this reveals another deep disagreement between Protagoras and Socrates on the nature of virtue and education. For
Protagoras, there is no real difference between discussing virtue through dialectic
Griswold, “Relying on Your Own Voice,” 292.
I mean the reference to eristic argumentation in (4) to encompass both eristic and parasitic
interpretation. I conceive of eristic argumentation, more broadly, as argumentation that is directed
at defeating one’s opponent and has no concern for truth. One can engage in such argumentation
whether one is criticizing the poets (eristic interpretation) or relying on their authority (parasitic
interpretation). I thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing out the ambiguity.
72
73
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or in the context of poetry, since the ability to impress others by talking about
virtue can be achieved through myth, argument, and the interpretation of poetry.
Consider his own indifference to whether he answers Socrates’s initial question
about the teachability of virtue in an argument or a myth (320c3−7). For Protagoras, there is no preferred methodological approach because getting at the truth
is simply not the point; to be capable in a plurality of forms of expression only
increases one’s persuasive possibilities. Thus, once Protagoras transfers the topic
of virtue to the context of poetry, he changes the entire focus of the conversation.
Something quite significant is lost in the transfer, namely, the relationship of the
conversation to the topic of virtue, and with it, his own relationship to truth and
self-knowledge. For both Protagoras and Socrates, being virtuous seems to involve
being able to talk about virtue, but, for Socrates, the value of such a discussion
consists in its orientation toward the truth.
Since Protagoras’s conception of being δεινός is completely divorced from
the virtues implicit in philosophical dialectic, it is, as Socrates playfully suggested
earlier in the dialogue, bad. It is to concede one’s voice and to fail to exhibit philosophical virtue. And Protagoras himself is bad, insofar as he both fails to use his
own voice and, in encouraging others to passively accept his wisdom, discourages
others from using theirs. We see Protagoras’s failure to use his own voice again
and again in his continual refusal to participate in good faith in the philosophical
conversation, as Socrates conceives of it. In other words, Protagoras will not use
his voice to engage in dialectical conversation, will not test himself, is not responsive to the voice of others, and does not seem interested in the question of truth.
He will only use his voice to lecture to others, to persuade them, and to attain a
great reputation. Despite his enchanting voice and commanding presence (see
314e−315b), in Socrates’s sense, he has no voice at all.
It is clear that these explicit criticisms target at least sophistic interpretation.
It was Protagoras who introduced the notion of interpretation as a methodology
in the first place, and his sophistic version of it seems to be at stake throughout.
In addition, Socrates is talking primarily to a group of sophists, whose shared assumptions about interpretation seem a relevant constraint. Further, Socrates does
not mark any difference between his own parody of sophistic interpretation and
the kind of interpretation he criticizes. Indeed, the content of the three parodic
criticisms anticipate and partly correspond to the criticisms of interpretation that
Socrates explicitly articulates.74 Both sets of criticisms share and respond to worries about the role of the absent poet,75 the possibility of settling the question of
the poem’s meaning, and the way that the focus on poet and poem distracts us
from the pursuit of truth. However, there are also reasons to think that the target

74
As I argue, in both Mx. and Crat., Plato employs both explicit argument and parodic distortion
in order to criticize a non-philosophical methodology or practice: see Trivigno, “The Rhetoric of
Parody,” and “Etymology and the Power of Names.”
75
Pappas (“Socrates’ Charitable Treatment,” 255), McCoy (“Socrates on Simonides,” 359), and
Frede (“The Impossibility of Perfection,” 747) all claim that Socrates, in his interpretation, uses his own
voice. I admit that there is a sense in which he does, but it is decidedly not the sense that is relevant
to Socrates’s critique of interpretation here. A core part of using one’s own voice involves testing the
truth and oneself. Socrates does neither of these in his interpretation.
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of explicit critique might be more general than merely sophistic interpretation.
Sophistic interpretation operates within and takes its bearings from a larger cultural
context in which facility with the interpretation of poetry plays a prominent role.76
Thus, the general criticisms may be said to be aimed at the contemporary practice
of interpretation, of which sophistic interpretation is an advanced version. Indeed,
Socrates’s focus on what happens when poets are interpreted in a discussion would
seem to confirm this point, suggesting that such discussions were not infrequent.
A further question concerns whether the criticisms target the model of philosophical interpretation as well. While the notion of philosophical interpretation
was implied by standards internal to interpretation itself, Socrates here seems to
be employing the standards of philosophical dialectic to critique interpretation
in general. From the perspective of the former standards, the point seems to be
that we should interpret poetry in a philosophical way; from that of the latter, the
point seems to be that we should do philosophy and not interpret poetry at all.
In the next section, I show how these two positions are ultimately compatible.

5. value and tr uth in interpretation?
In this section, I am, to a certain degree, leaving the text behind and trying to think
through the implications of explicit criticisms examined in section 4 in relation
to the ideal formulated at the end of section 3. In short, I attempt to see whether
and under what conditions the ideal can escape the criticisms. To repeat, the ideal
of interpretation—philosophical interpretation—would involve satisfying at least
three basic criteria:
[1]	Remain indifferent to the poet qua authority;
[2]	Attempt a plausible reconstruction of the poem’s intended meaning so that a
philosophical view is formulated;
[3] Critically assess and test that view.

Given the criticisms outlined in section 4, philosophical interpreters should be
using their own voice, that is, testing themselves and aiming at the truth.
The first criterion of genuine interpretation is explicitly psychological. A philosophical interpreter must have and display a certain attitude of indifference toward
the reputation and alleged wisdom of the poet; in short, he is not to be treated
as an authority figure. This attitude can enable the interpreter to test herself and
aim at the truth, since she will be neither insulated from responsibility to the view,
since it is the poet’s view, nor distracted by the poet’s status when it comes to the
assessing the philosophical content of the view. In this way, an interpreter can
avoid relying on the voice of the poet, while at the same time making use of the
poet’s words. A sophistic interpreter approaches a poem as the words of a potential
ally or rival in the pursuit of reputation and standing in the community. Thus,
he cannot help but see the poet as an authority figure and thus his interpretations—eristic or parasitic—will rely on the voice of the poet to the epistemic gain
of neither. The philosopher, by contrast, will not presume that the poet is wise.
She will thus be tempted neither to try to show herself wiser by criticizing the poet
Halliwell, “The Subjection of Muthos to Logos,” 94−98.
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nor to show herself wise by knowing what the poet knows. At worst, the poet will
seem no better than the sophist in that he is engaged in the pursuit of fame and
honor. At best, the philosopher will see in the poet someone who is attempting to
express a true claim. Either way, the indifference to the poet qua authority figure
means that the philosopher should adopt a critical attitude when approaching
the work of the poet. This attitude should not be purely disparaging, as eristic
interpretation is in the pursuit of fame, but intelligently critical, as the elenchus
is in the pursuit of knowledge.
The second criterion shifts the focus of attention from the poet to the poem.77
As we have seen, the sophistic approach to the poem is mercenary. The philosophical approach can be said to be mercenary in a certain sense as well. For a
philosophical interpreter will make the poem suitable for discussion by attempting
a plausible reconstruction of the poem’s intended meaning in such a way that a
philosophical view, that is, a position with truth-conditions, emerges. In this way,
one’s interpretation can aim at the truth. This blunts the force of the criticism
that the meaning of a poem is never fully decidable, without entirely giving up
the idea that the author’s meaning should play some role in constraining interpretations. If responsibly using one’s own voice entails a kind of receptivity to the
voice of others, then a philosophical interpreter will exhibit the virtue of good
will, in her willingness to formulate a view out of the poem and her openness to
countenancing it, even if it is strange or radically different from her own. Many
of Socrates’s interlocutors fail to exhibit the virtue of good will in refusing even to
countenance claims that Socrates makes—for example, it is better to be wronged
than to wrong—since they are so alien and unexpected. In order to use a poem
to test oneself, one needs to be open to the possibility that there is something in
the poem that one can learn from. This does not mean that one should expect to
be a passive learner. On the contrary, the reconstruction of the poem’s meaning
will require thinking beyond what is explicitly stated in the text to, for example,
underlying premises.78 It may require, as the example of Simonides’s poem and
its relation to Pittacus suggests, that one reflect on the larger intellectual context
in which the poem was composed. Poets are often responding to one another and
to events and attitudes in their cultural-historical context; thus, understanding
what poets say may require understanding this more or less implicit context. By
engaging the poem in this complex quasi-dialogue of discovery, one can partially
overcome the problem that the poet cannot be questioned. One can question
poets in absentia by thinking through the view for them.
The third criterion of philosophical interpretation is that one ought to critically
assess and test the view expressed. If done properly, both the interpreter and the
77
Pappas (“Socrates’ Charitable Treatment,” 257−58) rightly see that the focus on the author is
potentially distracting from the question of truth.
78
However, the poem is, at least in part, supplanted as the proper locus of unity, since it is the view
that begins to take center stage at this point. Along these lines, Halliwell (“The Subjection of Muthos
to Logos,” 110−12) argues that Plato’s reading of poets is anti-contexualist, in the sense that he does
not make an effort to place claims within the context of a larger work and does not seem interested in
drawing distinctions between the poet and his characters. This is what allows Socrates to quote short
lines of poetry out of context in the course of a discussion. However, Halliwell does think that Plato
thinks of the larger ethical, cultural, and intellectual milieu when citing poetry.
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truth of the claims can be tested. The absent poet would obviously not get any of
the benefits of the critical examination. Socrates’s parody, recall, failed precisely
in this regard: it did not test or critique the view at all. But a rational assessment
would seem essential to the maintenance of an appropriately critical distance. In
discovering and/or reconstructing a philosophical view from a poem, one has
set the stage for the critical evaluation, which on this view is the culmination and
most important aspect of interpretation. It is not enough simply to reconstruct
the view. If satisfying [2] requires the virtue of good will and a kind of dialogue
of discovery, then satisfying [3] requires the virtue of frankness and a kind of
elenchic dialogue. Through questioning the view and vigilantly pursuing lines of
criticism, one can test the adequacy of the view. Whereas the first two criteria explicitly or implicitly left the poet behind, the third leaves the poem behind. Once
the view is formulated, its connection to the poem (and thus to the poet) becomes
irrelevant, and the philosophical view takes center stage. In short, criterion [3]
requires philosophy. In this way, the interpretation of poetry transcends itself, and
interpretation becomes an essentially philosophical endeavor.
We are now in a position to say more precisely in what way the ideal of interpretation, according to which one should interpret poetry in a philosophical way, can
withstand Socrates’s explicit criticisms of interpretation, which seemed to suggest
that one engage in philosophical dialectic and not interpret poetry at all. Since
philosophical interpretation transcends itself and moves from the interpretation
of poetry (narrowly construed) to philosophical dialectic, it constitutes both a new
way of interpreting poetry and a way of leaving the interpretation of poetry behind.
To the extent that the activity of interpretation has any value, it will have such
value only insofar as it puts the interpreter, who brings the poem into the space
of reasons, into a possible relationship to the truth. In sum, the interpretation of
poetry only has value to the extent that it imitates living philosophical dialogue
in its engagement with the poem and provokes philosophical reflections aimed
at the truth. This value is limited and parasitic on philosophical dialectic, which
gets its value from its relationship to truth.
As I have reconstructed it, the ideal of interpretation does alleviate the force
of the explicit criticisms, and it seems possible both to interpret a poem while at
the same time using one’s own voice and aiming at the truth. However, there are
some residual difficulties, which threaten to make the practice of philosophical
interpretation quite difficult to achieve successfully. Success is contingent on one’s
ability to navigate a tension at the heart of philosophical interpretation between
criteria [2] and [3], which pull us, as it were, in different directions. If one is
caught up exclusively with the task of trying to elaborate the poem’s meaning, then
one is focusing on the wrong activity. The formulation of a philosophical view is
instrumental to the critical evaluation, and an interpreter ought not aim primarily
at the plausible reconstruction, but at the potential truth of the philosophical
claims under discussion. An interpreter constructing a philosophical interpretation will display his proper epistemic attitude by being oriented primarily by and
toward the truth of the claims at stake. In other words, there is a hierarchy of concern,
in which interpretive fidelity is trumped by the truth. This hierarchy need not
involve or imply a breach of the virtue of good will. That is, this does not imply
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that an interpreter employ Pappas’s version of the principle of charity, whereby
she attributes to a poem only true claims, or claims she already thinks are true. In
fact, employing the principle of charity thus construed would not only represent a
failure to meet criterion [2], since one is not open to a different view, but it would
also represent a failure to meet criterion [3], since one does not in any relevant
sense critically assess and test the view under discussion. The tasks involved in
satisfying [3] thus depend on those involved in satisfying [2], but it is not clear
when we have adequately satisfied [2]. In short, it is not quite clear at what point
the task of elaboration is over, and there are no direct adequacy conditions for
the satisfaction of [2]. We must guard against the possibility of expending too
much effort on exposition, but we must also guard against expending too little
and moving to critical analysis too quickly.79 There seems to be no straightforward
way of eliminating the tension.
The persistence of this tension suggests that the dialogue of discovery with the
text—governed by the virtues of good will—and the elenchic dialogue—governed
by the virtues of frankness—are perhaps not neatly separable into distinct tasks.
Or alternatively, they may be theoretically or ideally separable, but this separation
may prove in practice extremely difficult. It may be instructive to look briefly at
Plato’s own practice of critical interpretation—albeit of a philosophical work—in
the Theaetetus. Shortly after Socrates declares that the exposition of Protagoras’s
epistemology is completed (160d−161b) and begins to critically evaluate it, he
stops, complains that he and his companions are “crowing” before victory is won
(164c5−6), and, invoking the “interests of justice” (164e7),80 he goes back to the
task of exposition in order to “rescue” Protagoras (165a6−7). Indeed, Socrates
complains that they have adopted the methods of controversialists, using a (merely)
seeming contradiction to refute a view (164c8−d2). This suggests that their elaboration of the view had not been fair because it had been implicitly tainted by the
critical evaluation; what Socrates does, then, is reformulate parts of the Protagorean position such that it becomes both a more accurate and coherent reflection
of Protagoras and a more difficult position to refute. Thus, we might think of the
hierarchy of concern as involving a kind of reflective equilibrium between the virtues
of good will and frankness, which will help us think and ideally move us toward
the truth. But the need for such a reflective balancing act suggests that we cannot
simply and easily separate our reconstruction of a view from our critical assessment
of it. At what point the demands of good will and justice in exposition end may
not be clear to us until after we have begun to criticize.

79
A version of this problem comes in recent debates about the history, or historiography, of
philosophy. What Daniel Garber (“What’s Philosophical”) calls the “antiquarian approach” to the
history of philosophy involves placing an author’s view in the context of the author’s body of work,
his intellectual context, and his larger social and historical context. In Garber’s brief exposition of
the antiquarian’s version of Descartes, he asks, at increasingly broad levels of context, “But why stop
here? ”, suggesting that the task of the antiquarian historian of philosophy is interminable (132−37).
80
Socrates invokes justice on the grounds that “they are trampling an orphan” (164e3−4), since
Protagoras is not merely absent but dead; cf. Phdr. 275d−e, where a written text is described as an
orphan, which “when attacked unfairly, always needs its father’s support.” Though I will not pursue
the point here, it may be that conversational and interpretive good will are both functions of justice.

538

journal of the history of philosophy 51:4 0ctober 2013

A further worry with respect to [2] concerns the suitability of certain poets
and poems for philosophical extrapolation and examination; it is plausible to
suppose that some will require more exertion on [2] and others less. One might
even be inclined to think that some poets and their poetry are simply unsuitable
for philosophical interpretation, but given Socrates’s ability to see philosophical
commitments in even the most innocuous-seeming comments,81 we should be
careful about embracing this position. Consider, for example, the case of the
warrior-poet Archilochus, whose poetry, which ranges from the intensely vindictive to the military-political to the nearly pornographic, might seem prima facie
unsuitable for the kind of analysis suggested here. In one of his more famous
poems (West 5), he writes,
Ἀσπίδι μὲν Σαΐων τις ἀγάλλεται, ἣν παρὰ θάμνῳ
ἔντος ἀμώμητον, κάλλιπον οὐκ ἐθέλων·
αὐτὸν δ᾽ ἐξεσάωσα. τί μοι μέλει ἀσπὶς ἐκεινη;
ἐρρέτω· ἐξαῦτις κτήσομαι οὐ κακίω.
Some Thracian delights in my shield, which near a bush
I left unwillingly, a blameless armament.
Myself I saved! Why should I care about the shield?
To hell with it! I’ll get another one, just as good.82

One might be tempted to pass this poem over on the grounds that it is personal,
narrative, and about a shield. But it is clearly not merely that, for abandoning
one’s shield was seen as the paradigmatic act of cowardice, and Archilochus,
writing during the archaic period, can and has been seen here as challenging the
older epic tradition and its ideals of bravery and manhood.83 Such ideals were still
in fashion even in the classical period. After quoting the first three lines of the
poem, Sextus Empiricus reports the story of the Spartan mother who told her son
before going off to battle to return either with his shield or on it, that is, dead.84
Archilochus’s decision, as depicted here, represents an evaluation of the relative
importance of one’s life and one’s reputation and, in criticizing the Homeric-epic
and contemporary cultural ideals of courage, might be said to implicitly endorse
an alternative conception of virtue. In rejecting “death before dishonor,” he seems
to be celebrating his own craftiness in escaping death.
In developing a philosophical position out of this poem, we might take as our
starting point something like the claim that death is an evil. From there, we could
extrapolate that life is a good and begin to tell a story about virtue or excellence
as concerning the preservation of one’s life. This sketch has moved altogether too
quickly, but notice that we are already on philosophical ground and an analysis of
the philosophical content of the poem is now possible. Indeed, it is highly likely
that a critical evaluation of an extrapolated version of this content from the Socratic
81
For example, Socrates manages to draw a philosophical view out of Ion’s boasting (Ion
530a−531d), Euthyphro’s intention to prosecute his father (Euthphr. 3e−4e), and Cephalus’s claim
that wealth keeps one from having to cheat or deceive (Rep. 331a−d)
82
The Greek text is from West, Iambi et Elegi Graeci: Ante Alexandrum Cantati; the translation is
my own.
83
See Burnet, Three Archaic Poets: Archilochus, Alcaeus, Sappho, 41−42, for an analysis of the way that
poem “strips this shield of its symbolic power, reducing it to a mere object that can be bought and sold.”
84
Pyrrh. Hyp. 3.216.
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perspective will reveal severe shortcomings. A typical Socratic countermove would
be to suggest that it is not merely life, but a good life, that has value. Notice here
that even from a presumably false view of the human good one could manage to
move toward truth. One might see this as parallel to the way that the elenchus
begins with a claim, investigates it to find underlying premises and assumptions,
crafts a philosophical view, critiques that view, and comes to reject it as false even
while making progress toward understanding the topic at hand (where progress
can be understood even in the minimal sense of the clearing away of a false view). 85
Further, if philosophical dialogue is valuable not merely as a means to the demonstration of true propositions86 but as the lifelong activity that is constitutive of
the good life for a human being, then interpretation, insofar as it is philosophical,
has value as a component of this life.

6. objection: poetry as harmful diversion
I have suggested that the philosophical model of interpretation can partly escape
the critique of interpretation that Socrates offers, insofar as philosophical interpretation transcends itself. Regardless, one might be inclined to object that the
interpretation of poetry is not necessary to the attainment of truth, and, since
there is no good reason to take the poets seriously as authorities,87 it is likely to
be a harmful diversion as well. In short, there needs to be some truth to be had
through the interpretation of a poem, and if there is not, then while philosophical
interpretation of poetry is possible, there really is no point. Why should anyone
bother with poetry at all? It is, after all, an extraneous voice, and Socrates says,
“[O]urs is such a [well-educated] group, if indeed it consists of men such as most
of us claim to be, and it should require no extraneous voices, not even of poets”
(347e1−3). It may be conceded that “the best,” on Socrates’s account, at least
when they are at their best, will not bother with poetry. The best are surely the
wise ones, whose possession of knowledge renders the voices of others superfluous, but it is far from clear that Socrates considers the sophists or himself to be
part of this “divine” group—note the conditional nature of the claim. Indeed,
if Socrates’s interpretation does provide information on the Socratic view, then,
since perfection is unattainable, no human being will satisfy this criterion. If the
This analogy to the elenchus is not unproblematic, and I do not wish to engage here in a larger
debate about the elenchus, its goals, and logical structure. In the case of poetry, since there is no real
interlocutor at stake, the goal of interrogating a poem cannot be merely to prove the inconsistency
of the poet’s beliefs.
86
Throughout my discussion of the interpretation of poetry, I have focused on the formulation
and critical assessment of views, claims, and propositions, thus seemingly committing Plato to a notion of truth as concerned exclusively with the correctness of propositions. What, one might ask, of
the notion of truth as the eidetic vision of the soul, as formulated in e.g. the Rep. and the Phdr.? This
question goes beyond the scope of both this paper and the Prt. to address fully. In relation to the argument of this article, I will only point out that philosophical dialectic must itself be undertaken with
propositions, and insofar as I have made dialectic the model for philosophical interpretation, it too
will be concerned with truth-claims. Whether and how those propositions relate to and/or generate an
eidetic vision is a matter for a larger project, though nothing in my exposition is intended necessarily
to rule out a relationship between truth-claims and eidetic vision. I thank an anonymous reviewer for
drawing my attention to this deep and important issue.
87
Though this point is not made explicitly in this dialogue, it is very well-attested in others, most
prominently in Ap., Ion, and Rep.
85
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best leave poetry entirely behind, then Plato himself would not qualify as one of
the best, for, according to Halliwell, Plato’s “engagement with poetry is so evident,
so persistent, and so intense as to constitute a major thread running through the
entire fabric of his writing and thinking.”88 For the second best, however, interpreting poetry may be a valuable instrument in three ways: by provoking true
intuitions, by providing a starting point for one’s own philosophical reflections,
and by enabling philosophical conversation with others. These considerations
do not eliminate, but rather mitigate, the objection, for it may very well be that
interpretation of poetry is a harmful diversion even for those who enter into it
with philosophical intentions. For philosophical intentions are presumably not
sufficient for navigating the tension between criteria [2] and [3], and one may,
despite one’s intentions, become mired in the task of elaboration.
First, interpreting a poem might reveal something true. Even though it would
be a mistake to think of the poets as authorities, Plato elsewhere allows that some
poetry contains truth. However, the source of the truth in poetry is attributed not
to the poet but to the god. 89 One might say that a divine thought—a kernel of
truth—could be contained in a poem. In Simonides’s poem, that thought may have
been the one that makes divine goodness unattainable for man. We can think of
this as a pregnant thought—to adapt a metaphor from the Theaetetus—and we may
imagine Socrates, in thinking about Simonides’s poem, testing that thought in
his own internal reflections about the nature of goodness, virtue, and knowledge.
Thus, the fact that Simonides himself does not mean what he says in the way that
Socrates would find philosophically acceptable is irrelevant. In a quasi-dialogue
with the ideas in the poem, Socrates might have managed to reconstruct a Simonidean position, to subject it to philosophical scrutiny, and to reject its overall
meaning, while at the same time preserving a core insight of the poem. Only in
such an interpretation could Socrates be said to be subjecting mythos to logos and
using his own voice.
Second, a poem might provide a starting point for one’s own philosophical
reflections, and this may be useful whether or not the poem itself contains any
divinely inspired truth. As Socrates practices it, dialectic needs an opinion to
constitute the starting point for philosophical reflection, and he typically uses his
interlocutors to provide that starting point.90 In the absence of an interlocutor, a
poem might provide a serviceable substitute. A philosopher, in testing the claims
in a poem, engages in a kind of dialogue with it. The fact that Socrates claims to
have actually paid attention to the poem ought to be a relevant consideration.
One could think about the poem, engaging it in a silent dialogue, and this imitaHalliwell, “The Subjection of Muthos to Logos,” 94.
While it is certainly true that not all poems will contain divine thoughts, some poems may very
well do so. Socrates claims, in Ap. 22a−d; Ion 533d–535a, that the ultimate responsibility for a poem’s
truth and beauty lies with the gods. On the role(s) of divine inspiration, see Tigerstedt, Plato’s Idea of
Poetical Inspiration; Partee, “Inspiration in the Aesthetics of Plato”; and Trivigno, “Technê, Inspiration
and Comedy.” For a more skeptical view of inspiration, see Woodruff, “What Could Go Wrong with
Inspiration? Why Plato’s Poets Fail.”
90
The literature on the elenchus is varied and vast, but the claim that it begins with the opinion
of Socrates’s interlocutor seems to be relatively uncontroversial. For a classic exposition, see Vlastos,
“The Socratic Elenchus.” On Aristotle’s account of philosophical dialectic, it requires the analysis of
endoxa, or received opinions; see e.g. Top. 100a29–30.
88
89
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tion of living dialogue in thought—though inferior to live dialectic—would be
valuable nonetheless.
Last, interpreting poetry might have the indirect advantage of further enabling
a philosopher to engage in dialectical discussion with others.91 The poets were
taken very seriously as sources for wisdom by 5th and 4th century Greeks. In such a
historical context, it seems all the more imperative for a philosopher to take poetry seriously, to challenge and test poems in the search for understanding to see
whether or not they contain any truth. Thus, familiarity with poetry might prove
useful in conversations, in which poets were common points of reference. Plato
portrays Socrates as having extensive knowledge of poetry, and this knowledge
almost always comes up in a dialectical context.

7. conclusion
In this paper, I hope to have shown that the puzzle I began with can be resolved
if we understand Socrates’s interpretation of Simonides’s poem to be a parody,
which articulates implicit criticisms of sophistic interpretation that overlap with
and partly anticipate the explicit criticisms Socrates voices. The parody reveals
that sophistic interpretation—both eristic and parasitic—appeals to the authority of the poet, employs an exploitative and mercenary attitude to the text of the
poem, and exhibits an indifference to the truth of the claims under discussion.
The parodic criticisms rely on an ideal of interpretation, philosophical interpretation, whereby an interpreter remains indifferent to the authority of the poet,
attempts a plausible reconstruction of the poem so that a philosophical view is
being articulated, and critically assesses and tests this view. Such philosophical
interpretations have a hierarchy of concern, which subordinates textual fidelity
to the pursuit of truth. This model of interpretation is compatible with using
one’s own voice, that is, testing oneself and aiming at the truth; in other words,
it can partly escape the explicit criticisms Socrates voices against interpretation.
Sophistic interpretation of poetry has no value, while philosophical interpretation
has limited value, due to its possible relation to truth. I want to end by suggesting
that this account of the interpretation of poetry may have broader significance
for a more general hermeneutics, since it is not obvious that the poetical form
of the object of interpretation makes any significant difference to the account
of interpretation articulated here. In particular, the account might apply mutatis
mutandis to the interpretation of works of philosophy92 as well and thus might be
91
Aristotle (Met. 995a7−8) claims that certain people will only take a view seriously if a poet can
be cited as an authority for it. Thus, familiarity with poets might be useful for the philosopher trying
to engage people in dialectic. Even Aristotle himself, though dismissive of the idea that philosophical
ideas need support from poetry, cites poetry extensively; see Moraitou, Die Äusserungen des Aristoteles
über Dichter und Dichtung ausserhalb der Poetik.
92
There are, in addition, some good historical reasons for supposing the account to apply equally
well to philosophical works, especially since some major pre-Socratic philosophers, Parmenides and
Empedocles, composed their books in verse. Anaximander’s terms for the originating substance are
described by Simplicius as “poetical” (in Phys. 24, 13). Further, understanding the meaning of Zeno’s
book of puzzles, or of Heraclitus’s notoriously cryptic sayings could certainly qualify as an interpretive inquiry that one “can never finally decide.” The Sokratikoi logoi, including the Platonic dialogues,
were considered by Aristotle to be a species of mimetic poetry broadly construed (Poet. 1447b9–11).
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used to formulate the conditions for philosophical interpretation of philosophy.93
If this suggestion is right, then the interpretation of philosophical works, like that
of poetical ones, ought to aim to transcend itself by provoking living philosophical dialogue aimed at the truth. We can further imagine that Plato himself would
both want and aim to be interpreted in just this way.94
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abbreviations of ancient sources
Aristotle:
Poet.—Poetics
Met.—Metaphysics
Top.—Topics
Plato:
Ap.—Apology
Crat.—Cratylus
Euthphr.—Euthyphro
Euthd.—Euthydemus
Grg.—Gorgias
Hp. Mi.—Hippias Minor
Ly.—Lysis
Mx.—Menexenus
Phdr.—Phaedrus
Prt.—Protagoras
Rep —Republic
Sextus Empiricus:
Pyrrh. Hyp.—Outlines of Pyrrhonism
Simplicius:
in Phys.—Commentary on Aristotle’s Physics

